DEFINING QUALITY EDUCATION AS A GOVERNMENT
INTEREST: THE U.S. SUPREME COURT’S REFUSAL TO “PLAY
NICE” WITH THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, CONGRESS, STATE
SUPREME COURTS, AND THE COMMUNITY VOICE
*

Tiffani N. Darden

The Court’s equal protection doctrine threatens No Child Left Behind’s mandate to close the
achievement gap and the U.S. Department of Education’s renewed vigor to enforce civil rights, and the
execution of many state constitutional education clauses. School districts committed to quality
education must overcome the Court’s severely limited tolerance for racial classifications—a challenge
compounded by budget deficits, demographic shifts, requirements to use social science data, and the
effects of socioeconomic status. While state and federal governing bodies have reached a consensus to
improve educational quality using protected classifications, the Supreme Court’s equal protection
doctrine hampers achieving this goal because policy makers must work within ambiguous and
conflicting boundaries. Since 2009, in response to the Court’s anticlassification tenor, school districts
in Washington, Louisiana, and Indiana, approved magnet school programs. However, they have
scrounged for money to fund this race-neutral alternative to diversity. Last year, New Mexico passed
the first Hispanic Education Act aimed to close the achievement gap between Latino students and their
nonminority peers. Not long thereafter, Wake County, N.C., dismantled its socioeconomic integration
policy. Applying the Court’s tiered scrutiny analysis, a court may hold New Mexico’s legislation
unconstitutional and foreclose judicial remedies to Wake County parents opposing the board’s decision.
In stark contrast, the Department of Education supports New Mexico’s Hispanic Education Act and
publically admonished Wake County school board for its actions. In this Article I propose that the
Supreme Court recognize quality education, as defined by state constitutional education clauses, to be a
government interest sufficient to justify the use of protected classifications. Accepting quality education
as a government interest will honor Brown v. Board of Education’s antisubordination legacy, create
needed continuity in education law, promote deference to local officials and the democratic process, and
temper the Court’s colorblind ideology.
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INTRODUCTION
The language, standards, and knowledge base adapted to understand and communicate advancements in education policies have
outpaced the federal equal protection doctrine applied to examine
their constitutionality. According to most state constitutions, the
government’s obligation is to provide a quality, not an equal, educa1
tion for all children. Education scholars endorse the consideration
of multiple traits, such as race, socioeconomic status, family educational background, and social conditions of a student population
2
when analyzing the quality or adequacy of educational policies.
1

2

See Scott R. Bauries, State Constitutions and Individual Rights: Conceptual Convergence in
School Finance Litigation, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 301, 327 (2011) (noting that “litigants
began to focus their theories of state constitutional harm on the quality of education in a
state, rather than on its mere equality”); Josh Kagan, A Civics Action: Interpreting “Adequacy”
in State Constitutions’ Education Clauses, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2241, 2244 (2003) (presenting a
theoretical approach to defining and measuring the vague “adequacy” standard that nearly all state constitutions require of their schools); Paul A. Minorini & Stephen D. Sugarman, Educational Adequacy and the Courts: The Promise and Problems of Moving to a New Paradigm, in EQUITY AND ADEQUACY IN EDUCATION FINANCE 175, 188 (Helen F. Ladd et al.
eds., 1999) (noting that “the adequacy approach is . . . unlike the traditional school
finance cases . . . [as] adequacy cases aren’t about equality . . . [but] rather about spending what is needed”); Michael A. Rebell, Educational Adequacy, Democracy, and the Courts, in
ACHIEVING HIGH EDUCATIONAL STANDARDS FOR ALL 218 (Timothy Ready et al. eds., 2002)
(reviewing the history of cases addressing inequities in state education finance systems);
Regina R. Umpstead, Determining Adequacy: How Courts Are Redefining State Responsibility for
Educational Finance, Goals, and Accountability, 2007 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 281, 298 (describing
how courts strive to obtain “adequacy” or adequate educational settings for students, not
“equality of educational opportunity”).
See Tierney T. Fairchild, Commentary, Race and Class: Separate and Not Equal, 26 EDUC.
WEEK, no.3, Sept. 2006, at 35, 35–36, available at http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/
2006/09/13/03fairchild.h26.html (warning that classroom inequality will continue if ra-
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However, the allocation of educational resources to underprivileged
students results in federal claims compartmentalized as race, gender,
3
language, or wealth discrimination. As school officials attempt to
fulfill federal and state legislative mandates, the Supreme Court’s categorical treatment of protected classifications under its current
equal protection doctrine has proved and will continue to prove a
stumbling block.
When applying its equal protection doctrine, the Supreme Court
needs to reset its priorities. Though the Court advocates equal educational opportunity, the government interests accepted to justify policies using protected classifications ignore the socio-political and governance changes experienced since Brown v. Board of Education in
the public education context. In light of these advances, this Article
argues that an equal protection analysis of education reforms should
defer to the expertise of local and state school officials. To accomplish this deference, a state’s interpretation of its constitutional education clause should be recognized as an important, and even compelling, government interest, irrespective of the protected
classification—race, gender, or socioeconomic status—when determining constitutionality under the federal equal protection doctrine.
Communities rely on the classroom experience—shaped by
school administrators, educational experts, and teachers—to positively affect their children’s life pursuits. Racial minorities and poor families have employed grassroots movements, political lobbying, and the
courts to ensure their children receive a quality education. Recent
reforms in New Mexico and Wake County, North Carolina, aptly illustrate the incongruence between federal equal protection doctrine
and the goals of policymaking bodies.
New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson, on April 5, 2010, signed
into law the Hispanic Education Act, the first education statute targeted to close the achievement gap between Latino students and
4
their white peers. Debates on the statute’s merits held in New Mex-

3

4

cial discrimination is conflated with concerns related to poverty and class); Debra Viadero, Study Probes Factors Fueling Achievement Gaps, 23 EDUC. WEEK, no.13, Nov. 2003, at 1, 12,
available at http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2003/11/26/13ets.h23.html (citing that
black and Latino children are disadvantaged according to each of the fourteen researchbased learning indicators compiled by the Educational Testing Service).
16B C.J.S. Constitutional Law §§ 1116–1117, 1119–1120 (2011) (reproducing the strict
scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and rational or reasonable basis tests, and matters subject
thereto).
“The purpose of the Hispanic Education Act is to . . . provide for the study, development
and implementation of educational systems that affect the educational success of Hispanic students to close the achievement gap and increase graduation rates.” Hispanic Educa-
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ico’s Senate and House chambers roused visceral commentary. A
state senator who opposed the legislation argued that “[i]f a program
or service, or if funding, is beneficial for a high risk student who is
Latino it should be available to all students, regardless of race or cul5
ture.” Another legislator accused supporters of “developing a whole
6
new generation of racism” by singling out Latino students. The
chairwoman of the New Mexico’s Senate Education Committee responded that a “[o]ne-size-fits-all [strategy] is not getting the job
7
done, and the achievement gap keeps growing.” Other legislators
expressed a similar sentiment: policies tailored to address the academic challenges uniquely experienced by Latino children were
8
needed to resolve the achievement gap.
Garnering much more public fanfare, on March 23, 2010, the
Wake County Board of Education, by a five-to-four vote, repealed its
9
nationally acclaimed socioeconomic integration policy. Students will
10
now be assigned to schools located nearest their homes. Opponents
argued that neighborhood zoning would result in racial resegrega11
tion and student bodies with disproportionately high poverty rates.
The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People’s
(“NAACP”) state president blogged that “when children are packed
into the most underfunded, most segregated, most high-poverty
12
schools, it is nothing but a form of institutionalized child abuse.” A
commentator posed the critical question: “If we’re going to go back

5

6

7
8

9

10
11
12

tion Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-23B-2 (2010); see also Heather Clark, Updated: Debate Grows
Over Proposed Hispanic Education Act, ALBUQUERQUE J., Dec. 4, 2009, http://www.
abqjournal.com/news/state/aphispaniceducationact112-04-09.htm (highlighting the debate over the need for and funding sources of the Hispanic Education Act, which aims at
closing the achievement gap between Hispanic students and their white and Asian peers).
Marjorie Childress, Hispanic Education Act Targets Achievement Gap, N.M. INDEP., Feb. 4,
2010, http://newmexicoindependent.com/46173/hispanic-education-act-targetsachievement-gap (internal quotation marks omitted).
Susan Montoya Bryan, House Passes NM Hispanic Education Act, KRQE NEWS 13 (Feb. 10,
2010, 9:01 PM), http://www.krqe.com/dpp/news/politics/nm_legislature/house-passesnm-hispanic-education-act (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
See Lawmakers Debate N.M. Hispanic Education Act, EDUC. WEEK, Feb. 18, 2010,
http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2010/02/18/332118nmxgrhispaniceducation_ap.ht
ml?r=1722260786 (quoting New Mexico Senate Majority Leader Michael Sanchez, who
stated: “People have to acknowledge that [the achievement gap] exists. This is a start.”).
Stacy Teicher Khadaroo, Busing to End in Wake County, N.C. Goodbye, School Diversity?,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 24, 2010, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Education/
2010/0324/Busing-to-end-in-Wake-County-N.C.-Goodbye-school-diversity.
Id.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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to a system based on [students’] home address, how do we make sure
13
that every single kid has access to a high-performing school?”
Prior to the vote, Wake County’s superintendent resigned, candle14
light vigils and rallies ensued, and officers arrested four protestors.
Once board members voted to strike the plan, the NAACP filed a
formal complaint with the Department of Education’s Office of Civil
15
Rights, prompting a federal investigation. The complaint alleged
Title VI violations because school officials no longer factored diversity
16
AdvancED,
into student assignments and student reassignments.
the accreditation body for Wake County high schools, will also con17
duct a special review of the board’s decision.
Imagining federal litigation, to consider the constitutionality of either the New Mexico or Wake Forest reforms, strains one’s fidelity to
the Supreme Court’s equal protection doctrine in light of quality
education goals promulgated on the state and federal levels. Under
the federal equal protection doctrine, protected classifications analyzed under heightened scrutiny require state actors to provide an
important or compelling government interest and an appropriately
18
tailored means. Racial classifications demand the most rigid stan13
14

15

16
17

18

Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation mark omitted).
Thomas Goldsmith & T. Keung Hui, School Board Sit-in Ends With Arrests, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Wake County), June 16, 2010, http://www.newsobserver.com/2010/06/16/
535233/school-board-sit-in-ends-with.html; T. Keung Hui & Thomas Goldsmith, Citing
Conscience, Wake Schools Chief Resigns, WAKE COUNTY NEWS & OBSERVER (Wake County),
Feb. 17, 2010, www.newsobserver.com/2010/02/17/342924/citing-conscience-schoolschief.html.
T. Keung Hui, Thomas Goldsmith & Mandy Locke, Wake School Board Under Probe, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Wake County), Nov. 18, 2010, http://www.newsobserver.com/2010/11/18/
810056/wake-board-under-probe.html [hereinafter Wake School Board Under Probe] (“Wake
County school leaders will have to defend their student assignment and discipline policies
to federal civil rights investigators responding to complaints filed by the
NAACP. . . . Word of the Wake review comes . . . [after school officials] discarded socioeconomic diversity as a factor in school assignment . . . .”); see also T. Keung Hui, Thomas
Goldsmith & Mandy Locke, NAACP Takes Wake to Feds—Charges Aimed at School Board,
NEWS & OBSERVER (Wake County), Sept. 26, 2010, http://www.newsobserver.com/2010/
09/26/703383/naacp-takes-wake-to-feds.html [hereinafter NAACP Takes Wake to Feds]
(“[T]he state NAACP has launched a far-reaching legal effort to stop the transformation
of North Carolina’s largest school district.”).
NAACP Takes Wake to Feds, supra note 15.
Wake School Board Under Probe, supra note 15 (“The state NAACP is also responsible for a
special review being conducted by Advancing Excellence in Education Worldwide, or AdvancED, the Georgia-based group that accredits Wake’s 24 high schools.”).
E.g., Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (holding that state actions using racial and national origin classifications must be narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling government interest); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197–98 (1976) (holding
that state actions using gender classifications must serve an important government interest and be substantially related to stated objective).
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dard of review, a compelling interest; gender classifications require
an important interest; and wealth classifications require a legitimate
19
interest.
In New Mexico and Wake County, North Carolina, the contested
education policies invoked protected classifications known to affect
academic achievement, and, in both jurisdictions, advocates on either
side desire quality education for public school children. Under the
Court’s colorblind treatment of race and national origin classifications, applying strict scrutiny, New Mexico’s endeavor to commit
more resources towards one ethnic group may prove unconstitutional. However, the Hispanic Education Act contains provisions expressly advocated in the White House Initiative on Educational Excellence
for Hispanics, an executive order renewed last year by President Obama after the Department of Education completed an eighteen20
month tour of Latino communities around the country. Moreover,
the Hispanic Education Act’s purpose mirrors the statutory purpose
of No Child Left Behind’s (“NCLB”) Title I programs, closing the
21
achievement gap between at-risk students and their white peers. In
Wake County, proponents for socioeconomic integration may find no
relief through the federal courts because wealth discrimination receives a rational basis review. However, on January 25, 2011, Arne Duncan, the United States Secretary of Education, spoke out against the
22
district’s actions in a letter to the national press.

19

20

21

22

E.g., Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 227 (“[Racial] classifications are constitutional only
if they are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests.”);
Craig, 429 U.S. at 197–98 (“[C]lassifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.”); San
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 55 (1973) (noting that for issues of
wealth discrimination, the standard of review “is whether the challenged state action rationally furthers a legitimate state purpose or interest”).
See Mary Ann Zehr, White House Renews Attention to Hispanic Education, 30 EDUC. WEEK,
no.9, Oct. 2010, at 7, available at http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2010/10/27/
09hispanic-2.h30.html (“The Obama administration has renewed its commitment to key
priorities in the education of Hispanic students, including reduction of the dropout rate,
improved connections between pre-K12 and postsecondary education, and passage of the
‘DREAM Act,’ which would provide a path to legalization of some undocumented students.”).
Compare No Child Left Behind, 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2006), with Hispanic Education Act,
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-23B-2 (2010) (noting the similarities in the purposes of the federal
and state education statutes).
Duncan Chides Wake County for Dropping Diversity Plan, 30 EDUC. WEEK, no.18, Jan. 2011, at
5, available at http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2011/01/26/18brief-5.h30.html
(“U.S. Secretary of Education Arne Duncan has criticized a decision last year by North
Carolina’s largest school district to end its program of busing students to achieve socioeconomic balance.”).
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These scenarios accentuate the inability for federal equal protection doctrine to accommodate community interests, state and local
deference, and nudging from the federal executive and legislative
branches. For example, the Supreme Court’s anticlassification standard may outweigh the federal legislative and executive standards
leading New Mexico to create policies tailored to its constituency’s
needs. But how local and state officials translate federal educational
priorities into policy should encounter minimal interference from
federal courts. The Court’s categorical treatment splits potential
allies for quality education reform along race and socioeconomic
lines and encourages advocates to forum shop, manipulating the
equal protection doctrine’s focus on identity-based categories, as opposed to focusing on quality education goals.
In addition, federal equal protection doctrine constrains school
officials from developing innovative policies meant to compensate for
the full range of a student’s impediments. Racial and ethnic minority
students, alongside a heterogeneous group of poor Americans, share
a common goal: quality education in public schools. NCLB’s purpose to close the achievement gap between students, and the education adequacy doctrine refined through state finance litigation light a
path to redress this common issue. NCLB melds traditionally protected classes into a single group identified as disadvantaged or at-risk
students. Because NCLB measures a school’s success based on its
ability to close the achievement gap, policymakers must account for
myriad factors, including race, when crafting local and statewide edu23
cation reforms. Thus, in addition to satisfying the voting electorate
by implementing policies befitting their unique demographic needs,
state and local school officials must also possess a general understanding of how constitutionally protected traits intersect to affect a
student’s academic performance.
For decades, education scholars in law and the social sciences
have observed the Supreme Court’s inability to situate education law
challenges, involving protected classifications, within its equal protection framework. In the interim, legal academics have diligently developed a body of scholarship for interpreting the equal protection
clause that is germane to any context. In particular, scholars differentiate an antisubordination interpretation of the equal protection
clause from the anticlassification application underlying the current
Supreme Court’s colorblind ideology. Antisubordination theory in23

C. Joy Farmer, The No Child Left Behind Act: Will It Produce a New Breed of School Financing
Litigation?, 38 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 443 (2005).
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terprets the equal protection clause to prohibit institutional practices
and behaviors that reify the once-sanctioned, inferior status of minor24
ity groups. Professor Derrick Bell, in describing the remedial aspirations underlying the Brown litigation, observed “the real evil of preBrown public schools: the state-supported subordination of blacks in
25
every aspect of the educational process.”
This subordination included “unequal and inadequate school resources and exclud[ed]
black parents from meaningful participation in school policymak26
ing . . . .” Alternatively, anticlassification theorists deem any differential treatment based on a protected classification as presumptively
27
unconstitutional, without regard to purpose or benefit.
Heightened scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment, antisubordination ideals, and quality education pursuits under state constitutional education clauses need not be addressed in a discrete manner. In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District,
the Court declined to foreclose the possibility that other government
interests may be suitable for justifying the use of protected classifica-

24

25

26
27

See Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The Constitutional Future of Race-Neutral Efforts to Achieve
Diversity and Avoid Racial Isolation in Elementary and Secondary Schools, 50 B.C. L. REV. 277,
320 (2009) (“An antisubordination approach invalidates government action that reaffirms the disadvantage of historically oppressed groups.”); Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk:
Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117
HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1472–73 (2004) (describing antisubordination theory as “the conviction that it is wrong for the state to engage in practices that enforce the inferior social status of historically oppressed groups”); see also DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED:
THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 162–77 (1987) (presenting a dialogue regarding
the history of the Equal Protection doctrine); Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 10–
11 (2003) (challenging “the common assumption that . . . the anticlassification principle
triumphed over the antisubordination principle . . . [and] argu[ing] instead
that . . . antisubordination values have shaped the historical development of anticlassifcation understandings”); Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 107, 157 (1976) (exemplifying the manner in which the Equal Protection Clause
prohibits state governments from “using race as the criterion of admission” for public services).
Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE
MOVEMENT 5, 10 (Kimberlé Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter Bell, Jr., Serving Two
Masters].
Id.
Kenneth L. Marcus, Jurisprudence of the New Anti-Semitism, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 371, 408
(2009). See generally Balkin & Siegel, supra note 24, at 10 (discussing the view that the Supreme Court rejected the antisubordination principle in the 1970s in favor of the anticlassification principle); Siegel, supra note 24, at 1472–75 (discussing the development of
the anticlassification principle with respect to Brown).
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28

tions. Since the Supreme Court has yet to enunciate an exhaustive
list of government interests for the heightened scrutiny of protected
classifications, I argue that quality education, as interpreted under
the respective state constitutional education clauses, represents a viable candidate. Derek Black has also recently argued for incorporating state constitutional standards for public education into federal
29
law through the Fourteenth Amendment and Title I. These litigation strategies for federal claims unify cross-jurisdictional disputes initiated for the common cause of quality education in public schools.
Under the federal equal protection doctrine, plaintiffs must employ a body of law developed to determine the constitutionality of
policies invoking a discrete classification. If the Court were to recognize quality education, as defined by state constitutional education
clauses, as a compelling government interest, the Court’s categorical
treatment would need to give way to the possibility of heterogeneous
classes of plaintiffs bringing an action against the state for not fulfil30
ling its obligation to adequately educate all children.
In Part I, I examine quality education as a feasible and wellestablished (though not formally recognized) government interest
under the federal equal protection doctrine. The community debates surrounding race integration, the civil rights movements for
education reform instigated by other minority groups, and federal
legislation justify recognizing quality education as a government interest. Furthermore, I argue that state constitutional education clauses,
as interpreted by state supreme courts and legislatures, should guide
federal courts in defining quality education. Public education falls
within the purview of states’ rights, and finance equity lawsuits prosecuted over the past thirty years gave most state governments occasion
31
to define affirmative duties under their respective constitutions.
In Part II, I discuss the Supreme Court’s reluctance to acknowledge quality education as a federal constitutional goal for education
28

29

30
31

Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle, 551 U.S. 701, 720 (2007) (“Without attempting
in these cases to set forth all the interests a school district might assert, it suffices to note
that our prior cases . . . have recognized two interests that qualify as compelling.”).
Derek Black, Unlocking the Power of State Constitutions with Equal Protection: The First Step
Toward Education as a Federally Protected Right, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1343, 1349, 1393
(2010) [hereinafter Black, Unlocking the Power]; Derek Black, The Congressional Failure to
Enforce Equal Protection Through the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, 90 B.U. L. REV.
313, 363–66 (2010) [hereinafter Black, Congressional Failure].
Black, Unlocking the Power, supra note 29, at 1376.
See generally Rebell, supra note 1, at 239 (discussing core concepts that state courts have
incorporated into their state’s definition of “adequate”); Umpstead, supra note 1, at 282–
83 (stating that “adequacy” decisions with respect to education are made at the state level
and discussing various definitions of “adequacy”).
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policies invoking race, socioeconomic status, citizenship, and other
classifications. I provide an overview of the Court’s inability to give
definitive counsel for how the importance of education, although not a
federal right, should inform the constitutionality of education reforms involving protected classifications. I assert that the importance
of education arises as a recurring theme in the education context, regardless of the protected classification. The missing link, to provide
consistency with federal and state mandates, would be to incorporate
this principle as a government interest. In establishing its meaning,
we may draw upon the interpretation of NCLB through executive
programs, legislation, and education clauses of state constitutions.
In Part III, I argue that the Supreme Court’s colorblind ideology
and Fourteenth Amendment doctrine, as applied to education
reform, does not align with the obligation for school districts to consider social science data and protected classifications when developing programs. This obligation inheres from the interpretation of
state constitutional education clauses, state legislation, and federal
legislative and executive mandates. In this Part, I also highlight the
pressure to implement policies specific to a state or district’s demographics in light of achievement gap concerns. I review how the intersection of multiple traits affecting academic performance, such as
race, gender, and socioeconomic status, are especially difficult to accommodate given the Supreme Court’s categorical treatment of classifications.
I. PAST AND PRESENT, FEDERAL AND STATE: RECOGNIZING QUALITY
EDUCATION AS A GOVERNMENT INTEREST
Under the equal protection clause, the underlying grievance expressed by plaintiffs in federal courts has always incorporated quality
education as part and parcel of their equal educational opportunity
32
argument. In the education context, according to a majority of the
32

See generally Robert L. Carter, Public School Desegregation: A Contemporary Analysis, 37 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 885, 888–89 (1993) (arguing that low educational achievement among African-Americans can be attributed to the structure of school financing); Martha Minow, After Brown: What Would Martin Luther King Say?, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 599, 608–09
(2008) (stating that although early efforts in the Civil Rights movement focused on integration as a means for attaining equality of education, current scholarship suggests that
integration does not necessarily equate to higher quality of education for black students);
see also Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters, supra note 25, at 10 (“[C]ivil rights groups refuse to
recognize what courts in [various cities] have now made obvious: where racial balance is
not feasible . . . there is adequate legal precedent for court-ordered remedies that emphasize educational improvement rather than racial balance. . . . They are intended to
upgrade educational quality, and like racial balance, they may have that effect. . . .”).
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Supreme Court, the two government interests suitable for race-based
classifications are remedying intentional discriminatory acts and
33
If we focus on the normative goals
creating diverse classrooms.
enunciated in Brown, these were not the only aims. The black community wanted its children to receive a quality education. The call
for integrated schools provided a mere experimental solution to
34
achieve quality education for an underserved group.
Post-Brown education reforms implemented by the federal executive and legislative branches and state governments demonstrate the
proper emphasis on quality education as a government interest under
equal protection doctrine. Within a decade of Brown, the federal
government entered the realm of public education governance.
Congress passed legislation requiring schools to comply with Brown’s
35
desegregation mandate. In addition, Congress accepted an ambitious charge from President Lyndon B. Johnson to boost the academ36
ic achievement of all children adversely affected by impoverishment.
State supreme courts also entered the governance landscape, defining quality education with comprehensive interpretations of their re37
spective state constitutional education clauses.
If the Supreme Court accepted quality education as a government
interest, federal courts would be guided by a wealth of defined standards from nearly every state when analyzing protected classifica38
tions. Moreover, the federal government’s involvement in public
education governance would provide a unifying backdrop for these
state-specific constitutional standards. The following sections describe why quality education accurately describes the community and
government interests contested through federal litigation efforts and

33

34

35
36

37
38

In Parents Involved, a majority of the Supreme Court, recognized two compelling governmental interests: (1) “remedying the effects of past intentional discrimination” and (2)
“the interest in diversity.” 551 U.S. at 720–22.
See Carter, supra note 32, at 885 (stating that the promise of Brown has been eclipsed by
the “intransigence of racism which has isolated poor African-American children in decaying cities and in substandard schools”).
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d–2000d-1 (2006).
See MICHAEL A. REBELL & JESSICA R. WOLFF, MOVING EVERY CHILD AHEAD: FROM NCLB
HYPE TO MEANINGFUL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 47–48 (2008) (providing a historical
description of the passage of bills by Lyndon Johnson that provided more federal funding
for education); see also PATRICK J. MCGUINN, NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF FEDERAL EDUCATION POLICY, 1965–2005, at 28–33 (2006) (providing
historical insight into the motives behind the creation of the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act).
See supra note 1.
Black, Unlocking the Power, supra note 29, at 1349–50, 1399–1401.
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gradually adopted through federal legislation and interpretations of
state constitutional education clauses.
A. Revisiting the Roots of Brown from a Layman’s Perspective
1. Quality Education and the Desegregation Debates
The black community wrangled with the benefits of desegregation
long before the Brown litigation. The insufficient resources provided
for black students in public schools, as justified through the separate
but equal doctrine and pervasive prejudice, spurred a national debate. David Tyack observed that “[t]he demand for desegregation in
northern cities was for most blacks a quest for equality and quality in
schooling more than some vague aspiration for mixing of ethnic
39
groups.”
The quality education theme, and whether integrated schools may
result in quality education for black students, predates the equal protection clause. In Roberts v. City of Boston, decided twenty years before
the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification, a family sued the Boston
Public Schools system to end its segregation policy and admit their
40
young daughter to an all-white elementary school. The court ruled
against the black family, holding that “[i]t is urged, that this maintenance of separate schools tends to deepen and perpetuate the
odious distinction of caste, founded in a deep-rooted prejudice in
public opinion. This prejudice, if it exists, is not created by law, and
41
probably cannot be changed by law.” Although the Roberts family
embraced desegregation, its arguments before the court represented
only one proposed solution to the dissatisfaction brewing in the
community with regards to public education.
The Roberts case incited a local controversy detailed by historians
42
Stephen and Paul Kendrick in the documentary Sarah’s Long Walk.
This pre-Fourteenth Amendment desegregation battle resulted in a
school boycott, violent community in-fighting, political activism, and

39
40

41
42

DAVID B. TYACK, THE ONE BEST SYSTEM: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN URBAN EDUCATION 280
(1974).
59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198, 198–202 (1849); see TYACK, supra note 39, at 113 (discussing the
sentiment of the black community in Boston with respect to integration of primary
schools in the 1840s); see also SHEILA CURRAN BERNARD & SARAH MONDALE, SCHOOL: THE
STORY OF AMERICAN PUBLIC EDUCATION 44–46 (Sarah Mondale & Sarah B. Patton eds.,
2001) (providing a narrative on the historical context of Roberts).
Roberts, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) at 209.
STEPHEN KENDRICK & PAUL KENDRICK, SARAH’S LONG WALK: THE FREE BLACKS OF BOSTON
AND HOW THEIR STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY CHANGED AMERICA xi–xxiii (2004).
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a protracted state litigation based on novel legal theories. The integrationists, led by Benjamin Roberts, the young girl’s father, and her
legal representatives, adopted an equal treatment perspective inspired by the desire to alleviate the stigma associated with enrollment
44
in inferior, separate public schools.
In this historical narrative, the segregationist leaders, who were
educated in integrated schools, argued that blacks should look inter45
nally to improve education.
They argued that “black children
needed to be in their own schools; where they could be ‘cheered on
by the unanimous shout of encouragement of all [their] fellows with
46
no jeers or unkindness to make heavy [their] heart.’” Both sides petitioned the School Committee, and both sides debated their posi47
tions before the City Council. On September 17, 1849, the disagreement between the segregationists and integrationists erupted in
violence when integrationists blocked the black students who wanted
48
to attend the segregated black school from entering the building.
The attempt to compel participation in the school boycott ignited the
49
only black-on-black violence attributable to the desegregation issue.
Nearly a century later, the NAACP’s litigation strategy for racial
equality in the mid-twentieth century stirred a similarly heated debate
among civil rights all-stars. W.E.B. DuBois led the cavalry. DuBois
50
vocally opposed the NAACP’s “unmitigated” desegregation agenda.
In response to a reprimand from the NAACP for his public opposi51
tion to desegregation, DuBois resigned and reentered academia.
Back at Atlanta University, DuBois published Does the Negro Need
Separate Schools?, in the Journal of Negro Education, to elaborate on his
43
44
45
46

47
48
49
50

51

Id. at 117–40.
Id. at 113–16.
Id. at 118–19.
Id. at 119 (alterations in original). When Roberts made his intentions of integrating the
public schools known, the community’s reception ranged from apathetic to antagonistic.
Id. at 108. Many community members predicted the poor treatment of their children by
white peers. Id. These sentiments reflected a generational gap in attitude towards the
need to integrate the city’s black and white populations. Id. at 118. Black elders generally supported empowerment platforms, as opposed to integration. Id. The segregationists
carried over the same mindset to school integration.
Id. at 125–26.
Id. at 132–34.
Id. at 135.
RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND
BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 165 (1975). As a founding member of the
NAACP, respected activist, and leading scholar on black history, W.E.B. DuBois had considerable influence. His message eventually found its way into the NAACP’s magazine,
The Crisis. Id. at 166.
Id.
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viewpoint. His reasoning for supporting quality education, rather
than integration, fell neatly in line with the arguments segregationists
52
lodged a generation earlier. DuBois criticized the NAACP for pouring money into its litigation strategy to desegregate public schools
while bypassing a strategy to equalize resource allocations between
53
black and white schools. He reasoned the “futile attempt to compel
even by law a group to do what it is determined not to do, is a silly
54
waste of money, time, and temper.” He ended this essay with an infamous line that still resonates today: “[T]he Negro needs neither
segregated schools nor mixed schools. What he needs is Educa55
tion.” According to DuBois, this education required blacks to “be56
lieve in their own power and ability.”
But the desegregation movement pushed forward into the classroom. The transformation from a social movement to social reform
litigation required civil rights attorneys and parents to make prognostic decisions that, in hindsight, have affected the course of education
reform in ironic ways. In more recent years, with the benefit of hindsight, Professor Derrick Bell and Judge Robert L. Carter, both on the
front lines at one point or another during Brown’s hopeful implementation, clarified the movement’s mission toward achieving quality
education. Judge Robert L. Carter, a member of Brown’s original litigation team, reflected on the integration remedy in an essay, writing:
[W]e saw the dual school system as the key barrier to equal educational
opportunity for African-Americans. With the 1954 declaration in Brown
v. Board of Education, I believed the path was then clear for black children
to receive an equal education. My confidence in the inevitability of this
57
result now seems naive.

Accordingly, the NAACP tabled equalization arguments because the
attorneys believed that “integration was crucial to combating the
generally accepted American mainstream notion that black people
58
are educationally inferior to white people.” Based on the slow academic progress in predominately poor black communities following
Brown, Judge Carter concluded that “[a]lthough integration is a very
important goal[,] . . . [w]hat is desperately needed is [sic] decent

52
53
54
55
56
57
58

Id. at 165–66.
W.E.B. DUBOIS, Does the Negro Need Separate Schools?, in DUBOIS ON EDUCATION 139 (Eugene F. Provenzo, Jr. ed., 2002).
Id. at 136.
Id. at 143.
Id. at 140.
Carter, supra note 32, at 885 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 889.
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schools that will provide the means for a toehold on the ladder to
59
mainstream employment.”
In Serving Two Masters, Derrick Bell analyzes the misinterpretation
of Brown by federal courts and civil rights attorneys: “[M]ost courts
have come to construe Brown v. Board of Education as mandating
‘equal educational opportunities’ through school desegregation
plans aimed at achieving racial balance, whether or not those plans
60
will improve the education received by the children affected.” He
argues that “court orders mandating racial balance may
be . . . educationally advantageous, irrelevant, or even disadvanta61
geous.” From his perspective, “civil rights lawyers continue to argue,
without regard to the educational effect of such assignments, that
62
black children are entitled to integrated schools.” In a subsequent
article, channeling DuBois’s sentiments for a new era, Bell concludes
that, “effective schools for blacks must be a primary goal rather than a
63
secondary result of integration.”
Public interest litigation forces advocates to fit their grievances
and solutions into legally cognizable claims for relief. This process is
similar to foreign language translation, where a second language’s
limited vernacular may cause much to be lost with regards to expressing the problem and resolving an issue. Anti-segregationist goals,
couched in legally cognizable remedial terms, are not consistently
deemed synonymous with quality education goals. In the next section, I briefly survey the Supreme Court’s vacillation in identifying an
objective for equal educational opportunity through the desegregation cases.
2. Lost in Translation: Conquering Quality Education Through
Judicial Interpretation and Legalese
The battle to define desegregation’s goals as quality education or
as equal educational opportunity took form over a series of Supreme
Court cases. For some Justices, the quality education goal remained
exceedingly clear, while other Justices advocated for equal access to
public schools. One commentator observes that, “for social scientists
desegregation was a process of social change and required integration, for lawyers desegregation was a remedy, its content shaped by
59
60
61
62
63

Id. at 896.
Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters, supra note 25, at 5 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 8.
Id.
Id. at 26.
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64

the nature of the litigation process.” Furthermore, even though the
social science and judicial definitions for desegregation coincided for
over two decades, these differences help us understand the “reluctance of current members of the Supreme Court to sanction raceconscious remedies which are not directly linked to issues of constitu65
tional fault.”
The Supreme Court candidly admitted in Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Board of Education that district courts “of necessity, em66
braced a process of ‘trial and error’ . . . .” Accordingly, it is important to view the original arguments presented in Brown as a hypothe67
sized means to the desired end of quality education. In 1954, the
Brown attorneys argued desegregation was the means to quality education, and the Court acquiesced, because separate-but-equal had
failed black children. Brown sought to remedy the specific act of
educating black children in segregated, inferior schools based on an
68
unconstitutionally discriminatory social norm. In its holding, however, the Court expressed an equal protection goal that spanned
beyond racial classifications. The way subsequent Courts interpreted
Brown’s goal directly affected the remedies available under the equal
protection doctrine.
Expanding the government interests recognized to justify using
protected classifications would in turn broaden the scope of remedies
found constitutional under the equal protection doctrine. Throughout the desegregation cases, Supreme Court opinions implicitly acknowledged the goal of elevating educational quality provided to students, but the Justices never formed a strong consensus. In Green, the
Court held that the duty to eliminate discrimination required judicial
decrees that “so far as possible eliminate the discriminatory effects of
69
the past as well as bar like discrimination in the future.” As Justice
Douglas later envisioned, an integrated school system went beyond
racially balanced schoolrooms to include “equality of facilities, in70
struction, and curriculum opportunities throughout the district.”

64
65
66
67
68
69
70

Anne Richardson Oakes, From Pedagogical Sociology to Constitutional Adjudication: The Meaning of Desegregation in Social Science Research and Law, 14 MICH. J. RACE & L. 61, 67 (2008).
Id.
402 U.S. 1, 6 (1971).
Jack M. Balkin, What Brown Teaches Us About Constitutional Theory, 90 VA. L. REV. 1537,
1561–62 (2004).
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493–94 (1954).
Green v. Cnty Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438 n.4 (1968) (internal quotation marks omitted).
See Keyes v. Sch. Dist., 413 U.S. 189, 226–27 (1973) (“An integrated school system does
not mean . . . that every school must in fact be an integrated unit. A school which happens
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Justice Marshall recycled this argument in Milliken v. Bradley, stating
that black students “must receive ‘what Brown II promised them: a
school system in which all vestiges of enforced racial segregation have
71
been eliminated.’” Some district courts embraced this message. In
Freeman v. Pitts, the lower court considered the, “quality of education
being offered to the white and black student populations” in addition
72
to the Green factors. When the case reached the Supreme Court, it
accepted educational quality as a “legitimate inquiry” that “unders73
cores the school district’s record of compliance.”
Other members of the Court have overlooked the quality issue
embedded in the desegregation arguments. A more narrow view of
appropriate government interests confines policymakers to less effective means for resolving education deficiencies unique to at-risk students in their district’s population. In Freeman, Justice Scalia proposed that “[t]he constitutional right is equal racial access to schools,
not access to racially equal schools; whatever racial imbalances such a
free-choice system might produce would be the product of private
74
forces.” Three years later, in Missouri v. Jenkins, Justice Thomas accurately observed that “[t]he mere fact that a school is black does not
mean that it is the product of a constitutional violation. A ‘racial im75
balance does not itself establish a violation of the Constitution.’”
However, the failure to provide a quality education to a protected
class, as required by state constitutions, should be a federal constitutional violation under the equal protection doctrine.
In his dissent to the Court’s most recent pronouncement on racial
assignments in public education, Parents Involved in Community Schools,

71

72

73
74
75

to be all or predominantly white or all or predominantly black is not a ‘segregated’ school
in an unconstitutional sense if the system itself is a genuinely integrated one.”).
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 798 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Wright v.
Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 463 (1972)); see also Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S.
237, 260–61 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (defining vestiges as “any condition that is
likely to convey the message of inferiority implicit in a policy of segregation”).
See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 473–74, 482–83 (1992) (arguing that “vestiges of the
dual system remain in the areas of teacher and principal assignments, resource allocation,
and quality of education”); Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 436 (1968) (holding
that schools should consider “problems related to administration, arising from the physical condition of the school plant, the school transportation system, personnel, revision of
school districts and attendance areas into compact units to achieve a system of determining admission to the public schools on a nonracial basis, and revision of local laws and
regulations which may be necessary in solving the foregoing problems” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Freeman, 503 U.S. at 492.
Id. at 503 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 115 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting United
States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 745 (1992)).
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Justice Stevens noted the majority’s cursory handling of Brown’s quality education requirements. He admonished the Court’s emphasis on
racial classifications and argued for a more historically accurate view
of the situation: the Brown plaintiffs sought an education for their
children on par with that afforded white children—an equal educa76
tion opportunity argument encompassing quality education. Justice
Stevens wrote:
There is a cruel irony in the Chief Justice’s reliance on our decision in
Brown v. Board of Education . . . . The Chief Justice fails to note that it was
only black schoolchildren who were so ordered; indeed, the history
books do not tell stories of white children struggling to attend black
schools. In this and other ways, the Chief Justice rewrites the history of
77
one of this Court’s most important decisions.

The Court inconsistently focused on quality education concerns underlying equal protection challenges to desegregation policies. Advocates for other protected groups, however, latched onto this argument in proposing changes to public education. The following
section exhibits how concerns held by English-language learner
(“ELL”) advocates have progressed through an emphasis on quality
education.
B. The Domino Effect: How the Brown Decision Inspired Quality Education
Goals for Other Marginalized Groups
Brown inspired quality education movements on behalf of other
identifiable groups including non-native English-speaking children,
the poor, girls, and special education students. Each group has
gained great benefits from the Brown decision. Scholars credit Brown
for “precipitat[ing] a more assertive civil rights movement” and push78
ing forward the quality education agenda for other minority groups.
An education historian observed that before Brown, officials “often
confused individual variation with gross social inequalities associated
with poverty, oppression on the basis of color, or other features of the
79
multiple subcultures of a highly plural society.” Since Brown, we
now understand quality education concerns encompass other races
76

77
78

79

See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 551 U.S. 701, 798–803 (2007)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that school districts’ use of racial classification in an effort to integrate “should be viewed differently” than the segregation presented in Brown).
Id. at 798–99 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
ROBERT J. COTTROL ET AL., BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: CASTE, CULTURE, AND THE
CONSTITUTION 8 (2003) (arguing that Brown was a catalyst of a more aggressive civil rights
movement in the 1950s and 1960s, and that the movement ultimately brought about farreaching change in American race relations).
TYACK, supra note 39, at 216.
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and ethnicities, gender issues, varying learning abilities, and concentrated poverty in urban schools.
At some point, parents in most racial and ethnic minority communities protested the objectively inferior treatment of their children
in the public education system. In Lau v. Nichols, the Supreme Court
decided a class action challenging the school district’s refusal to provide transition language classes to non-English-speaking Chinese students under the equal protection clause and the Civil Rights Act of
1964. Although the Court did not reach the constitutional issue, the
Court unanimously decided that the Civil Rights Act’s prohibition
against national origin discrimination in education proscribed the
80
district’s actions. The Court held that the “district must take affirmative steps to rectify the language deficiency in order to open its in81
structional program to these students.”
In this lawsuit, the class
members did not request a specific remedy, only that school officials
rectify the problem using their expertise to identify the appropriate
82
means.
Although advocates for ELL students initially found themselves
working within the civil rights framework of desegregation cases, they
eventually parted ways in achieving the same goal for their respective
83
constituency: a quality education. Two decades after Lau, educational research on the best approach to ELL programs flooded academic circles. Determining the most effective approach to educating
English-language learners fractured supporters of transitional lan84
guage programs.
Throughout the nation, districts implemented
several variations to acclimating non-English-speaking students into
85
the classroom. The two dominant approaches, English immersion
and bilingual education, had pervaded the divisions between inter86
ested scholars.
80
81
82
83

84

85
86

Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 566 (1974).
Id. at 568 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 565.
Kristi L. Bowman, Pursuing Educational Opportunities for Latino/a Students, 88 N.C. L. REV.
911, 924–26 (2010); Rachel F. Moran, Rethinking Race, Equality, and Liberty: The Unfulfilled
Promise of Parents Involved, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 1321, 1358 (2008) [hereinafter Moran, Rethinking Race]; Rachel F. Moran, The Politics of Discretion: Federal Intervention in Bilingual
Education, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 1249, 1272, 1284 (1988) [hereinafter Moran, Politics of Discretion].
Moran, Politics of Discretion, supra note 83, at 1249–50 (chronicling the debates between
social advocates, legislative bodies, and education regulators, for how to best incorporate
ELL programs into public schools and enforce government policies).
Id.
English-Language Learners, EDUC. WEEK, Aug 4, 2004, http://www.edweek.org/ew/issues/
english-language-learners/. English immersion teaches the English language while si-
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ELL experts still debate which approach is “right” and all sides are
wedded to identifying the best method for teaching English as a
second language. Studies conducted to determine the best approach
produce inconclusive and contradictory results, similar to studies regarding the benefits of integrated classes and the need to pump more
resources into inner-city schools. Moreover, immigrant parents hold
different opinions on whether their children should follow an English immersion or bilingual track in public schools. Taxpayers have
weighed in, offering their opinion through state referendum: in California, Arizona, and Massachusetts, voters chose to curtail the attention and public funding allotted to English-language learning pro87
grams.
NCLB and the Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974 regulate educational programs offered to English language learners. Section 1703(f) of the Equal Educational Opportunities Act requires
school district to aid students in “overcom[ing] language barriers”
88
through “appropriate action.” Courts review challenges pursuant to
this section using three factors:
1. whether the school’s program is based upon sound educational theory
or principles; 2. whether the school’s program is reasonably calculated
to implement the educational theory effectively; and 3. whether, after a
period of time sufficient to give the program a legitimate trial, the results
of the program show that language barriers are actually being over89
come.

For English-language learners, the open mandate to provide a
quality education, under state and federal legislation, leaves states to
implement policies that fulfill this broadly understood equal protection goal. At the end of the day, constitutional law has permitted
educational experts to experiment with various methods for teaching
students who may very well hold a national origin discrimination
claim under the Fourteenth Amendment’s strict scrutiny analysis.

87
88
89

multaneously teaching students academic lessons. Id. Bilingual education, whether transitional or two-way bilingual education, teaches English and academic lessons on separate
tracks. Id. Students may encounter English and their native language in one classroom,
or they may split their day between academic lessons taught in their native language and
those focused on developing their English-language skills. Id.
Id.
Equal Educational Opportunities Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f) (2006).
Types of Educational Opportunities Discrimination, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.
gov/crt/about/edu/types.php (last visited Nov. 2, 2011).
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C. Contemporary Quality Education Goals: Federal and State Stakeholders
Acting on One Accord
The standard that all children should be provided a quality education, no matter the interpretation, remains intact from Brown. The
reality that desegregation is a fringe priority for many education policymakers along with Title I’s focus on the quality problem
evinces the Court’s diminished current role in defining government
interests—a shift in the conversation led by political leaders requires
90
a shift in the Court’s approach to the policies. The arguments supporting the fundamentality of public education to our democratic society, the structure of education governance, and the shared vision
that all children must receive a quality education suggest revisiting
the government interests that federal courts recognize under heightened scrutiny.
1. Federal Stakeholders: Quality Education Through the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act of 1965
Within the federal government, the priority given to race seems
imbalanced when moving from the Supreme Court’s equal protection doctrine to the federal officials setting national education goals.
Since the nation’s inception, its political leaders have maintained the
importance of education. Congress and the Department of Education, through statutes and regulation, codified this commitment to
quality education for all public school students. It requires school
districts to take into account a student’s race, gender, socioeconomic
status, and learning abilities.
Long before the Fourteenth Amendment and the goals of racial
equality, political leaders championed the importance of minimal
education for citizens. Horace Mann famously proclaimed about
education that “beyond all other devices of human origin, [it] is the
equalizer of the conditions of men, the great balance wheel of the so91
cial machinery.” Thomas Jefferson and his peers proposed that our
democracy rested on the ability of an educated citizenry able to “understand public issues, who would elect virtuous leaders, and who
would sustain the delicate balance between liberty and order in the
92
new political system.” According to Jefferson, these public respon90

91
92

Bowman, supra note 83, at 950–51; Kevin Brown, Reflections on Justice Kennedy’s Opinion in
Parents Involved: Why Fifty Years of Experience Shows Kennedy Is Right, 59 S.C. L. REV. 735,
738–39 (2008).
BERNARD & MONDALE, supra note 42, at 29.
Id. at 13.
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sibilities required the ability to read and write. Historian E.D. Hirsch
supposes that Mann and Jefferson advocated in harmony for minimal
education standards because “both of them disliked the idea of the
family you were being born into determining how you ended up in
93
American life.” The national rhetoric surrounding quality education resulted in Congress imposing the obligation for states to establish free, non-sectarian public school systems as a condition of enter94
ing the Union.
Post-Brown federal legislation channeled the notion that education should be considered a national priority inclusive of the poor
95
and racial minorities. The Johnson administration’s political agenda, known as the War on Poverty, expanded the social justice charge
to public school officials: it addressed the educational deficiencies of
all poor children, and it sought to improve public education for the
96
purpose of ending poverty. In the early 1960s, Congress attacked
the poverty and race issues in the public education system through
two major pieces of legislation: the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the
97
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (“ESEA”). ESEA’s
original purpose sought “to strengthen and improve educational
quality and educational opportunities in the Nation’s elementary and
98
secondary schools.” Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, public
school programs discriminating on the basis of race, color, or national origin would jeopardize receiving federal funds, including Title I
99
funding distributed through ESEA.
Through NCLB, ESEA’s latest reauthorization, Congress enacted
goals and accountability standards that oblige participants to act in a
100
certain manner across all spectra of public education.
During his
2000 campaign, President George W. Bush ran on the platform that
101
education reform is a civil rights issue and a national priority.
At
the Republican Convention, he proclaimed that disparities in aca93
94
95
96
97
98

99
100

101

Id. at 31.
Id. at 47.
MCGUINN, supra note 36, at 31; Black, Congressional Failure, supra note 29, at 314, 336.
MCGUINN, supra note 36, at 1; TYACK, supra note 39, at 270.
TYACK, supra note 39, at 270.
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27
(amended 2002); see also MCGUINN, supra note 36, at 33 (describing ESEA’s projected impact on national education policy at the time it was passed).
Title VI of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d–2000d-1 (1965).
Kamina Aliya Pinder, Federal Demand and Local Choice: Safeguarding the Notion of Federalism
in Education Law and Policy, 39 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 9 (2010) (“[T]he IASA required states receiving the ESEA Title I finds to adopt state standards and assessments aligned to measure progress toward those standards.”).
MCGUINN, supra note 36, at 157.
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demic performance were attributable to “the bigotry of low expecta102
tions.” NCLB Title I’s Statement of Purpose reads: “to ensure that
all children have a fair, equal, and significant opportunity to obtain a
103
high-quality education . . . .” Even though the methods imposed to
bring about greater equality in educating impoverished children,
pursuant to NCLB, have been criticized as ineffective, the core pur104
pose of Title I remains intact.
Moreover, NCLB, President Bush’s
banner legislation, provides support for an array of education reforms that involve race, gender and wealth classifications—one classification requiring no greater amount of scrutiny than the other.
2. State Stakeholders: Quality Education Through State Constitutional
Education Clauses
Local goals in educational achievement increasingly align with
federal mandates to better educate disadvantaged children. To reach
complete equilibrium, it is necessary to build a homogenous body of
law for education experts to follow when developing policy. This section focuses on the efforts by states, through judicial precedents and
legislation, to establish a quality education standard. It briefly recounts the history of education finance litigation and its semblance to
the struggles for racial equality experienced in public schools
through federal courts. The Article then discusses the sophistication
of education reform arguments in state courts that encompass an antisubordination ideal, much different from the anticlassification
standard our highest court supports.
According to the Supreme Court, “[p]roviding public schools
105
ranks at the very apex of the function of a State.” Public education
regulation falls within the Tenth Amendment powers reserved to the
106
states.
Nearly every state constitution includes a clause relating to
the level of education to be provided to children enrolled in public
107
schools. And to date, forty-five states have heard cases challenging
108
the distribution of education funds.
102
103
104
105
106
107

Id. at 159.
Title I of No Child Left Behind, 20 U.S.C. §6301 (2006).
Black, Congressional Failure, supra note 29, at 348–63.
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972).
Charles J. Russo, Reflections on Education as a Fundamental Human Right, 20 EDUC. & L.J. 87,
88 n.4 (2010).
See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 1, at 2260 (“All state constitutions but one include a clause guaranteeing an adequate education . . . .”). For example, the New York state constitution
requires the state legislature to “provide for the maintenance and support of a system of
free common schools, wherein all the children of this state may be educated.” N.Y.
CONST. art. XI, § 1. The Massachusetts state constitution states that:
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One scholar comments, “The focus on ‘adequacy’ may sound minimal, but the adequacy suits seek to raise standards, resources, and
aspirations for all students and to do so in ways that reflect evolving
109
demands on the economy and society.”
Another observes, “[I]n
their broadest sense, adequacy cases go beyond [the] basic finance
purpose and reformulate a state’s responsibility for and treatment of
its public educational establishment, encompassing the finances,
110
goals, and accountability for the outcomes of education.”
State
constitutional education clauses are ambivalent to the protected classifications recognized under the federal equal protection doctrine;
instead, they focus on what needs to be done to provide students with
111
a certain level of education.
In this section, I ultimately conclude that just as the Department
of Education entrusts states to develop educational improvement
plans for compliance with NCLB, the federal courts should recognize
state constitutional standards under heightened scrutiny.
a. From Equity to Adequacy: The Quest for More than Equal
Treatment’s Promise
Scholars describe education finance reform as undergoing three
112
“waves” of litigation in federal and state courts. Initially, education
finance advocates embarked upon a litigation strategy based on the

108

109
110
111

112

Wisdom, and knowledge, as well as virtue, diffused generally among the body of
the people, being necessary for the preservation of their rights and liberties; and
as these depend on spreading the opportunities and advantages of education . . . it
shall be the duty of legislatures and magistrates, in all future periods of this commonwealth, to cherish the interests of literature and the sciences, and all seminaries of them.
MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. V, § 2.
See Access Quality Education: School Funding Litigation, NAT’L EDUC. ACCESS NETWORK,
http://www.schoolfunding.info/litigation/litigation.php3 (last visited Nov. 2, 2011)
(“Lawsuits challenging state methods of funding public schools have been brought in 45
of the 50 states.”).
Minow, supra note 32, at 634–35 (footnotes omitted).
Umpstead, supra note 1, at 282–83.
Id. at 286, 306, 313 (reviewing the interpretations of state supreme courts, and concluding that these constitutional provisions require public schools to perform three objectives
aimed at “develop[ing] the intellectual, emotional, and moral capabilities of students as
individuals, workers, and participants in our political system”).
See Michael Heise, State Constitutions, School Finance Litigation, and the “Third Wave”: From
Equity to Adequacy, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1151, 1152 (1995) (“Commentators note three distinct ‘waves’ of school finance court decisions.”); William E. Thro, Judicial Analysis During
the Third Wave of School Finance Litigation: The Massachusetts Decision as a Model, 35 B.C. L.
REV. 597 (1994).
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same principles guiding the race integration cases. Inspired by the
state court decision, Serrano v. Priest, attorneys filed wealth discrimination claims in federal court arguing for equitable spending between
114
property-rich and property-poor districts in their respective states.
In San Antonio v. Rodriguez, a group of parents filed a class action lawsuit against school officials challenging the state’s public education
115
financing system. The proposed class sought remedies on behalf of
“schoolchildren . . . who are members of minority groups or who are
116
poor and reside in school districts having a low property tax base.”
With desegregation becoming more of a challenge for the federal
judicial system, the Court decided to pass on the opportunity to re117
pair financial disparities in public education.
Rodriguez foreclosed
equal protection arguments under the federal Constitution, effectively ending the first round of school finance cases.
After the defeat in Rodriguez, arguments presented in state courts
continued to echo the equity themes previously brought in federal
118
court. The second wave of disputes began in New Jersey state court
the same year as Rodriguez. For example, Education finance litigation
in New Jersey, which spanned three decades, originated with the Ro119
binson v. Cahill dispute. Advocates argued that state funding systems
violated equal protection and failed to meet the state’s responsibility
to adequately educate students. In Robinson, the state supreme court
found violations of the state’s constitutional education clause, requiring a “thorough and efficient education” be provided to students in
120
public schools.
After years of state legislative resistance, the New
113
114

115
116
117

118

119
120

See Rebell, supra note 1, at 221–25 (describing plaintiffs’ reliance on Brown’s promise of
equal educational opportunity to argue for more equitable school funding).
See generally Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1255 (Cal. 1971) (finding that the school
financing system discriminates on the basis of the wealth); Minorini & Sugarman, supra
note 1, at 183.
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1973).
Id. at 5.
The Court reasoned that “[s]ince the members of a legislature necessarily enjoy a familiarity with local conditions which this Court cannot have, the presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the most explicit demonstration that a classification is a
hostile and oppressive discrimination against particular persons and classes.” Id. at 41
(quoting Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940)).
Minorini & Sugarman, supra note 1, at 183 (explaining that many state court judges were
no longer persuaded by wealth discrimination after the Supreme Court’s decision in Rodriguez).
See Robinson v. Cahill, 355 A.2d 129 (N.J. 1976) (reviewing a legal challenge to the New
Jersey Public School Education Act of 1975).
See id. at 132 (“The goal of a thorough and efficient system of free public schools shall be
to provide to all children of New Jersey, regardless of socioeconomic status or geographic
location, the educational opportunity which will prepare them to function politically,
economically and socially in a democratic society.”).
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Jersey court set forth explicit expectations for its public education sys121
Close to one decade later, in the twentieth Abbott decision
tem.
over a twenty-year period, the New Jersey Supreme Court declared
the legislature’s educational funding plan constitutional under its
122
education clause.
Most recently, Governor Chris Christie at123
In
tempted to cut the school budget by over one million dollars.
response, the Abbott plaintiffs filed a motion to temporarily block the
state’s actions and deny monetary shortfalls in the state budget as an
124
excuse for not fulfilling education adequacy obligations. The court
granted this motion.
Outside New Jersey, equal protection arguments received a mixed
welcome in state courts. The objective comparisons between resources provided to students attending wealthier and property-poor
125
districts resonated in some states but produced no results in others.
Over time, finance equity advocates reoriented their rallying cry to
request quality education for all public education students pursuant
to state constitutional education clauses. This transition resembled
the broadened goals observed in the desegregation strategy—a quantitative comparison of inputs was not enough to achieve the move126
ment’s goals. Moreover, education finance advocates realized early
on that education quality across any particular state wavered based on
more than the racial composition in one’s school or district. Even
poor white children were not receiving the same quality education as
127
their suburban white peers. As Derrick Bell argues in his theory of

121
122
123

124

125
126
127

See Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 295–96 (N.J. 1973) (analyzing school reform proposals and setting new requirements for standard public education).
See Abbott v. Burke, 971 A.2d 989, 1009–10 (N.J. 2009) (finding that the school funding
reform act conforms with the constitutional provisions for public education).
See Access Quality Education:
New Jersey Litigation, NAT’L ACCESS NETWORK,
http://www.schoolfunding.info/states/nj/lit_nj.php3 (last visited Nov. 1, 2011) (“[I]n
the Spring of 2010, newly elected governor Chris Christie and the state legislature
adopted an austerity budget that cut education funding by $1.08 billion, or 13.6%.”).
See id. (“In June 2010, the Education Law Center, on behalf of the Abbott v. Burke litigants,
filed a motion requesting the state’s high court to block implementation of the 2010–
2011 budget, because it failed to fund schools at the levels required by the 2008 School
Funding Reform Act (SFRA).”).
Minorini & Sugarman, supra note 1, at 190–91, 199 (explaining the different reactions to
adequacy arguments in state courts).
Id. at 177 (“[E]mphasis moved away from a comparison of conventionally measured educational resources to an emphasis on ‘intangibles.’”).
Id. at 179 (arguing that differences in school quality may not have been a race question
because schools in some suburbs seemed markedly superior to schools in other districts
that largely enrolled white pupils).
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interest convergence, the interests of poor whites and blacks are ex128
ceedingly similar.
The third wave, known as the “adequacy movement,” began with a
phenomenal state court precedent, Rose v. Council for Better Educa129
tion. This decision marked a transition from a fiscal equity strategy
to “arguments focused on ensuring that all students have access to
educational resources and opportunities adequate to achieve desired
130
educational outcomes.” Commentators observe that this new focus
was “one rooted not so much in comparing the poor education some
children obtain with the superior education of other children, but rather in comparing the inadequate education many children receive
131
as judged by some absolute standard.”
In Rose, the state supreme court served as a trailblazer for future
adequacy cases by enumerating seven goals to be achieved through
132
attaining a public education.
Moreover, the state legislature followed the court’s prescription for quality education through passage
133
of legislation cued to the court’s formula for finance reform.
In
turn, these learning goals prodded an increase in the state’s education budget. A subsequent case, Young v. Williams, once again challenged Kentucky’s public school budget, arguing that schools could
not achieve the constitutional education goals set forth in Rose under
funding cuts. The district judge invoked the separation of powers
doctrine to dismiss the case. In this instance, plaintiffs decided not to
appeal the decision.
Education finance litigation in New York also highlights the transformation in strategy from equity and adequacy arguments. In the
first wave, plaintiffs filed Levittown v. Nyquist, challenging the funding
disparities between the state’s property-rich and property-poor dis-

128

129

130
131
132

133

See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest Convergence Dilemma, in
CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT, supra note 25,
at 20, 24 (“Hence, over time, all will reap the benefits from a concerted effort toward
achieving racial equality.”).
See Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 189 (Ky. 1989) (holding that the
Kentucky General Assembly had not provided for an efficient system of common schools
throughout the state and that state funding of education was not adequate).
Minorini & Sugarman, supra note 1, at 175–76 (citation omitted).
Id. at 176.
Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 215–16 (“Kentucky’s entire system of common schools is unconstitutional.”); see id. at 208 (providing that education must be efficient, free, controlled and
administered by the state, substantially uniform throughout the state, and equal to and
for all students).
Minorini & Sugarman, supra note 1, at 195 (mandating that an adequate education must
provide students with seven capabilities).
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134

tricts. The court of appeals relied on reasoning found in San Antonio v. Rodriguez, that the obligation to provide a public education did
not translate into an obligation to provide an equal quality education
135
to all children. In this holding, the court also pointed to the state’s
obligation to support “a sound basic education” to public school stu136
dents.
In 1993, New York plaintiffs regrouped to file a second lawsuit,
Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, against the state alleging failure to
137
comply with the state constitutional education clause. Several years
138
later, the plaintiffs prevailed. In conjunction with tasking the state
to improve public education, the court ordered a costing-out study to
help determine what needed to be done to satisfy the state constitu139
tion’s education clause.
The state’s highest court upheld this ruling, and charged the state legislature with calculating the funding
needed to provide a “sound basic education,” allocating such funds,
140
and implementing an accountability system.
When the state legislature delayed in compliance, the presiding
judge appointed a special master to answer the outstanding cost an141
swers. From this point, the state judicial, legislative, and executive
branches were able to find common ground in providing additional
funding and implementing an accountability system to ensure dis142
tricts met the constitutional education mandate.

134

135

136
137

138

139

140
141
142

Levittown v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359, 361–62 (N.Y. 1982) (challenging the state funding
scheme as a violation of the equal protection clause and the state constitution Education
Article because it results in “grossly disparate” educational opportunities in different districts in the state).
Id. at 364 (pointing out that the Supreme Court in Rodriguez had already rejected the
plaintiffs’ argument, that the disparity in per-pupil expenditure violated the Fourteenth
amendment).
Id. at 369.
See Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, No. 111070/93, 1999 WL 34782728, at *1 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Oct. 18, 1999) (reviewing plaintiffs’ claim that the state’s school funding mechanisms caused the education afforded to students to fall below the requirements of the
state constitution and discriminate against the city’s minority public school students).
Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 861 N.E.2d 50, 52 (N.Y. 2006) (“Mindful of the fundamental value of education in our democratic society, we agreed with plaintiffs’ interpretation of the Education Article.”).
See generally Access Quality Education:
New York, NAT’L EDUC. ACCESS NETWORK,
http://www. schoolfunding.info/states/ny/lit_ny.php3 (last visited on Nov. 2, 2011) (describing the orders given by the judge in Campaign for Fiscal Equality).
Campaign for Fiscal Equity, 861 N.E.2d at 59–61.
See supra note 139.
See id. (describing the legislature’s acceptance of Governor Elliot Spitzer’s 2007 funding
increase).
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b. Defining Quality Education as a Government Interest
Through State Constitutional Education Clauses
Since public education is undoubtedly regarded as a local matter
under state control, federal courts should incorporate the definition
of quality education, defined by the respective states as a government
interest justifying the use of protected classifications. As opposed to
the anticlassification doctrines applied by the Supreme Court, the
state constitutional interpretations act more along the lines of the antisubordination definitions argued for in interpreting the Fourteenth
Amendment’s equal protection clause. Whereas Brown “combined
education with discrimination on the basis of race,” the course of
education adequacy reform through state courts addressed race as a
143
component to fulfilling the state’s constitutional obligation.
The
goal for “high-minimum quality education for all” does “not rest on a
144
And while some state courts have renorm of equal treatment.”
fused the job of defining this minimal education standard, one may
find a definition through either state supreme court rulings or state
legislative mandates.
Even though the phraseology used in state constitutional education clauses reads slightly differently, “[a]lmost every state constitution requires its government to institute and sustain a system of pub145
lic schools.”
For the instances where state courts choose not to
become involved in the debate over quality education, they rely on
separation of powers principles; thus, state legislatures must define
educational standards and the amount of funding needed to attain
146
these goals.
Adequacy claims impose an affirmative duty on state
legislatures to create public education systems that offer minimal
147
provisions to every child enrolled in public schools.
Since Brown, education governance has experienced phenomenal
changes. Whereas local districts once held great autonomy, education reforms continue to layer oversight and implementation functions between federal and state government actors. Everyone involved, except the Supreme Court, recognizes the need to take
143
144
145
146
147

Minorini & Sugarman, supra note 1, at 181.
Id. at 188 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Umpstead, supra note 1, at 288–89; see also Black, Unlocking the Power, supra note 29, at
1343, 1366–71.
Minorini & Sugarman, supra note 1, at 199.
Kagan, supra note 1, at 2258 (“These clauses create positive states duties (such as the legislature’s obligation to provide an adequate education) . . . .”); Pinder, supra note 100, at
8 (discussing how “adequacy returns the determination of how to improve schools to the
state legislature”); Umpstead, supra note 1, at 286.
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comprehensive stock of the systemic challenges facing public education. State constitutional provisions align more with the direction of
contemporary education reform than the Supreme Court’s categorical treatment of protected classifications used to determine the constitutionality of education reforms.
Through state courts, constitutional education clauses have been
interpreted to adopt an antisubordination quality standard as opposed to an anticlassification colorblind ideology. The academic
outcomes resulting from finance litigation are not yet clear; however,
these cases do permit a space for legislatures and advocates to
148
recreate state educational systems.
For example, in Kentucky, the
financial inputs on the budgetary side were easily measured, but the
149
governance and accountability were not aptly implemented.
After
the Abbott litigation in New Jersey, school districts directly affected by
the court’s pronouncement experienced minimal gains in test scores;
however, New Jersey still fairs poorly as compared to other states
150
working to close the achievement gap.
More politically motivated opposition also plagues the implementation of judicial standards imposed under state constitutional education clauses. In Ohio, even though the state supreme court has repeatedly found its public education system unconstitutional, the
151
legislature refuses to act upon the pronouncements. The most infamous state finance litigation, in New York, appeared successful, but
extended debates between state and local officials regarding who
152
should fund the reforms have delayed program implementation.
The aftermath of these cases demonstrates that a quality education
focus under the law completes only one part to the reform puzzle. In
Part III, I elaborate further on this idea in a discussion of raceconscious state decisions referred to as the fourth wave of finance lit153
igation.

148

149
150
151
152
153

Frederick M. Hess, Adequacy Judgments and School Reform, in SCHOOL MONEY TRIALS: THE
LEGAL PURSUIT OF EDUCATIONAL ADEQUACY 159, 161, 168 (Martin R. West & Paul E. Peterson eds., 2007).
Id. at 159, 167.
Id. at 159, 172.
Id. at 159, 178.
Joe Williams, The Non-Implementation of New York’s Adequacy Judgment, in SCHOOL MONEY
TRIALS: THE LEGAL PURSUIT OF EDUCATIONAL ADEQUACY, supra note 148, at 159, 211.
Black, Unlocking the Power, supra note 29, at 1343, 1361–75; Kristi L. Bowman, A New Strategy for Pursuing Racial and Ethnic Equality in Public Schools, 1 DUKE F.L. & SOC. CHANGE 47,
57 (2009); Kevin Randall McMillan, The Turning Tide: The Emerging Fourth Wave of School
Finance Reform Litigation and the Court’s Lingering Institutional Concerns, 58 OHIO ST. L.J.
1867, 1896–1902 (1998); Denise C. Morgan, The New School Finance Litigation: Acknowledg-
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II. THE SUPREME COURT’S RELUCTANCE TO RECOGNIZE QUALITY
EDUCATION AS A GOVERNMENT INTEREST
Brown and its progeny were understood to address race integra154
The
tion, obscuring underlying demands for educational quality.
Warren Court mandated the experimental remedy of desegregated
schools. Although this judicial remedy could not cure the social
norms that led to a dual public education system, the proposed remedy sought to resolve its harmful effects. Brown forced federal and
state governments to rethink what provisions were needed to achieve
the normative goal of quality education for all children. Although
accurately described as a desegregation case, Brown I was more a constitutional challenge seeking quality education for black students.
Over the past fifty years, as demonstrated above, federal and state
government actors have adopted a quality education standard. Yet
the Supreme Court remains stagnant by insisting that the invoked
protected classification should gauge any degree of deference permitted to education policymakers.
The Brown decision hallmarked two triumphs, independent of
race, in the constitutional analysis of education policies: the Brown
attorneys successfully introduced social science evidence to help show
155
why the Court should prohibit state-mandated segregation, and the
opinion spoke to the importance of education and the need for all
American children to receive a quality education on par with one
156
another.
In Brown I, the Court took a comprehensive look at the
157
“effect” of “segregation itself on public education.”
Although not
explicitly arguing education as a fundamental right, the Court exalted the status of public education. Justice Warren wrote:

154

155

156
157

ing That Race Discrimination in Public Education Is More Than Just a Tort, 96 NW. U. L. REV.
99, 165–68 (2001).
Pamela S. Karlan, What Can Brown® Do For You?: Neutral Principles and the Struggle Over the
Equal Protection Clause, Lecture (Mar. 25, 2008), in 58 DUKE L.J. 1049, 1063 (2009) (explaining that Parents Involved cites Brown for the proposition that race segregation, rather
than unequal educational opportunities, provides the basis for finding a constitutional
violation).
Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483, 495 n.11 (1954) (listing social science studies); Rachel F. Moran, What Counts as Knowledge? A Reflection on Race, Social Science, and
the Law, 44 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 515, 517–18 (2010) [hereinafter Moran, What Counts as
Knowledge] (describing the NAACP Legal Defense Fund’s use of social science evidence).
Brown I, 347 U.S. at 493.
Id. at 492–93 (“We must consider public education in light of its full development and its
present place in American life throughout the Nation. Only in this way can it be determined if segregation in public schools deprives these plaintiffs of the equal protection of
the laws.”).
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[E]ducation is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments. . . . It is required in the performance of our most basic
public responsibilities . . . . It is the very foundation of good citizenship. . . . In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an educa158
tion.

Despite the generalized language espoused in Brown I, race still enjoys an enduring omnipresence in equal protection doctrine. Although we began the pursuit of quality education with an exclusive
focus on race, we now need to expand our horizons to meet the demographic challenges facing public education in today’s society.
The Court’s analysis involving classifications other than race acknowledged the importance of education but rejected quality education as a right guaranteed under the federal Constitution. The
Court’s holdings in San Antonio v. Rodriguez and Plyler v. Doe, both
non-race cases decided under rational basis review, showcase these
thoughts. The holdings in Rodriguez and Plyler represent the doctrinal
foothold for recognizing quality education as a government interest.
First, even though the opinions analyzed two distinct classifications
under rational basis review, the Court reached different conclusions
159
with regards to the rationality of state action.
Both classifications
required deference to the state legislature, but the Court still en160
gaged in a robust debate leading to opposite holdings. If the Court
incorporated quality education goals into equal protection doctrine
through deference to state officials, this would in no way compromise
the Court’s ability to identify policies in violation of equal protection
doctrine. This recognition would, however, provide an additional basis for education policymakers to realize the core goals of the civil
rights agenda.
Second, the importance of education played a role in the majority
161
and dissenting opinions for each case.
Although education’s role
in democratic society may not prove dispositive when determining
the deference to be accorded education experts, its role no doubt
exerts influence. The established importance of education, combined with the state’s reserved right to control public education matters, support the leap for federal equal protection doctrine to incor158
159
160
161

Id. at 493.
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 29, 58–59 (1973).
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216–18; Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 55. Each opinion drew four dissenting
votes.
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 222; id. at 234 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 248 (Burger, J., dissenting); Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 33, 71 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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porate quality education (as defined under state constitutional education clauses) as a viable government interest.
In Rodriguez, the Court held that there was no “right to education
162
explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.” The majority reasoned “the undisputed importance of education will not alone
cause this Court to depart from the usual standard for reviewing a
163
State’s social and economic legislation.”
In his dissent to Rodriguez, Justice Marshall argues that protecting
against “[d]iscrimination in the opportunity to learn that is afforded
164
a child must be our standard.” He held education essential for civic
participation in the political process and in the exercise of First
165
NCLB’s standards are congruent with Justice
Amendment rights.
Marshall’s thoughts on the appropriate level of equity in public education. He states:
[B]ecause some ‘adequate’ level of benefits is provided to all, [it does not
mean that] discrimination in the provision of services is therefore constitutionally excusable. The Equal Protection Clause is not addressed to the
minimal sufficiency but rather to the unjustifiable inequalities of state action.
It mandates nothing less than that all persons similarly circumstanced shall
166
be treated alike.

“Similarly circumstanced” need not be defined by a single trait; as defined under NCLB, “similarly circumstanced” encompasses all disadvantaged children and their ability to perform at proficiency levels
comparable to their peers. In this case, Justice Marshall reasserts his
argument for a “spectrum [of standards]” based on “the constitutional and societal importance of the interest adversely affected and the
recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular clas167
sification is drawn.”
In Plyler v. Doe, the Court deliberated whether “Texas may deny to
undocumented school-age children the free public education that it
provides to children who are citizens of the United States or legally
168
admitted aliens.” Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, stated that
“[t]he Equal Protection Clause was intended to work nothing less
than the abolition of all caste-based and invidious class-based legisla-

162
163
164
165
166
167
168

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 33–35 (majority opinion).
Id. at 35.
Id. at 84 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 112–13 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 89 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 99 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 205, 215–16 (1982) (examining laws passed by the Texas legislature withdrawing funds to support public education for students not legally residing in
the country and authorizing a district to deny enrollment on the same basis).
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169

tion.”
The law’s effect on children receiving a public education
170
proved influential to the Court’s analysis. The Court reasoned that
education stood apart from other governmental benefits due to its
role “in maintaining our basic institutions, and the lasting impact of
171
its deprivation on the life of the child.” Public education helps the
individual, which in turn helps society. Thus, society benefits from
the education of individuals participating in the economy and politi172
cal process.
ESEA solidified the government’s interest in providing quality
education to disadvantaged children, which encompasses more than
173
the color line of black and white. Most state supreme courts have
adopted this goal through interpretation of their respective constitu174
tional education clauses. And most recently, NCLB focuses on protected groups that have gained attention through the civil rights
movement sparked by Brown. The next Part discusses how social
science data advises education reforms supported by the federal executive and legislative branches and some state supreme courts. In
light of the mutuality between law and social science research, the
Supreme Court must find some space in its equal protection legal
doctrines to incorporate research-based methods in the evaluation of
education policies.
III. TOEING THE LINE: PROTECTED CLASSIFICATIONS, EDUCATION
POLICY, AND SOCIAL SCIENCE DATA
In addition to not recognizing a fundamental right to education,
the Court also uses its activist ideology to undermine educational
quality reform attempted by policy makers. In reviewing the Court’s
education doctrine under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Justices
seem to draw their guiding equality standard, colorblindness, from

169
170
171

172

173
174

Id. at 213.
Id. at 220–21 (arguing that children have no control over their parents’ conduct and that
public education is a special governmental benefit).
Id. at 221. Justice Blackmun’s concurrence echoed this sentiment, stating that “Rodriguez
implicitly acknowledged that certain interests, though not constitutionally guaranteed,
must be accorded a special place in equal protection analysis.” Id. at 233 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
Id. at 221 (“In sum, education has a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our
society. We cannot ignore the significant social costs borne by our Nation when select
groups are denied the means to absorb the values and skills upon which our social order
rests.”).
FREDERICK M. HESS & MICHAEL J. PETRILLI, NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND 132 (2006).
Kagan, supra note 1, at 2241–42; Rebell, supra note 1, at 218; Umpstead, supra note 1, at
282.
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the aspirational goal of resolving the original discriminatory act of
175
segregation. The Justices conduct this analysis based on an assumption that current social norms alleviate discriminatory realities, that
we have no greater understanding of the factors leading to underperformance in public schools, and that Congress has not implemented
a complete overhaul of education policy. As courts move from a proscriptive to permissive role in education policy, it will require the reconsideration of federal and state roles in improving education quality and social science research regarding the accessibility of
educational opportunities based on a student’s diverse demographic
background.
Congress and states rely on social science data to inform education reforms implemented to close the achievement gap and improve
underperforming academic programs. This reliance leads policymakers to conclude that race and other protected traits should be
considered for curricula and programs developed to remove the defi176
ciencies plaguing minority and impoverished communities.
The
Court’s individualistic anticlassification treatment of protected
groups inhibits school officials from enacting these informed, although experimental, policies. This Part discusses the push from
Congress, the Department of Education, and state courts for school
officials to incorporate social science data into their reform of education policies. Based on this encouragement, I argue that race and
other considerations, categorized as societal discrimination, are inevitably considered when crafting education policies for many geographical areas. Therefore, the Court’s equal protection doctrine
falls short in providing the deference needed for education policymakers to fulfill their federal and state mandates of developing policies reflective of social science research while simultaneously satisfying the Court’s equal protection standard.
A. The Entangled Web: Congress and States Encourage Reliance on Social
Science Evidence to Inform Education Policy
Race, gender, geography, and socioeconomic status serve as proxies for identifying children with such underserved educational needs.
The Court’s categorical treatment of protected classifications hinders
the ability of school officials to create policies tailored to their student population—an approach advocated by the federal government
and state constitutional education clauses. Brown I’s shock value
175
176

Karlan, supra note 154, at 1064; Robinson, supra note 24, at 313–25.
Fairchild, supra note 2.
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stems in part from the Court’s activist stance against race discrimina177
tion in public education. Then, the Supreme Court stood at the forefront of the executive branch and Congress to end segregation in
178
public schools. The Court filled a void during the 1950s; however,
it never loosened the reins to permit experimentation with education
reforms as contemplated in NCLB and state-level directives to local
districts.
Congress and local school officials are expected to overcome disconnects between policy goals and reality. The explanation for disparate academic performance has shifted from overt prejudice to the
residual, cumulative effects of overt and systemic prejudice. No longer are black children mandated by the state to attend poorly funded
and neglected schools, immigrant children denied language transition classes, or girls limited to a “life skills” curriculum track. A more
difficult issue lays on the horizon—systemic disparities, carrying no
179
less a detrimental effect on a student’s academic performance.
Jeannie Oakes, along with her co-authors, criticized the “inequality frame” presented in Rodriguez for transforming potential allies into
competitors by “[a]ppealing to those who have the least, along with
180
their allies driven by justice concerns.” They explain that this advocacy model ignores the advantages gained by all through redistribut181
ing education resources. Oakes lauds the “quality diagnostic frame”
for not suggesting the diminution of funds to certain schools, espe182
But she
cially middle-class communities that may feel threatened.
concludes that inequality and adequacy arguments may “offend those
183
who are relatively better served by schools.” Instead, she argues for
an expanded social justice framework that views “education as dependent upon, rather than competitive with, resources essential to

177
178
179

180

181

182

183

COTTROL ET AL., supra note 78, at 8.
Id. at 217.
REBELL & WOLFF, supra note 36, at 72–73; Jeannie Oakes et al., Grassroots Organizing, Social
Movements, and the Right to High-Quality Education, 4 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 339, 365–66
(2008).
Oakes et al., supra note 179, at 365–66. The authors describe the inequality frame as
“shaped in the more general struggles for civil rights and social equality, diagnoses the
problem as one of unequal access to educational opportunity, and calls for redistribution
and leveling.” Id.
Id. (“The inequality frame is self-limiting in its reach. . . . [It] fails to challenge the logic of
scarcity, [and] it seems to call for redistribution within a ‘zero-sum’ arena of high-quality
education.”).
Id. The Authors describe the quality diagnostic frame as “seek[ing] to increase material
resources for all, even as it redistributes the more abstract quality of relative ‘advantage.’”
Id.
Id. at 366.
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the health and well being of communities and families, and integrally
connected to health care, housing, income security, public safety, en184
vironmental protection, and so on.”
Similarly, Michael Rebell of Teachers’ College, in Moving Every
Child Ahead, argues that “to provide a meaningful educational opportunity to at-risk children from communities of concentrated poverty,
students must be provided, as needed, with specific out-of-school
185
educational essentials.”
This external support, funded through
public school budgets, includes early education, academic support,
186
and exposure to extracurricular activities. With the shifting demographic and push to develop innovative learning programs that close
the achievement gap, it is appropriate for the Court to develop an
analysis in line with what is being asked of school districts.
1. No Child Left Behind’s Goal to Close the Achievement Gap
NCLB ushered in a new era of federal involvement in K–12 public
education. Under the Johnson administration, education experts
measured success based on the “pace of state integration efforts and
187
the size and distribution of school resources.”
The 1960s reform
treated integration and monetary distribution as individual pieces of
the puzzle to achieve quality education and economic parity. However, under NCLB, the annual yearly progress requirements merged
these two quests under one mission. NCLB implemented requirements that encourage experimentation without wiping out desegregation as an educational priority, because the Civil Rights Act remained on the books.
NCLB’s overarching goal is closing the achievement gap between
188
at-risk students and their peers. Three explanations have been given to explain the achievement gap: first, “a lack of resources, particularly money and know-how, in needy schools;” second, “problems in
society and the larger culture, especially the effects of poverty;” and,
third, “a dysfunctional school culture and a lax system of governance
and incentives that permits school systems to avoid making unpopular decisions, even when those are essential to improving perfor184
185
186
187
188

Id. at 367.
REBELL & WOLFF, supra note 36, at 72–73.
Id. at 72–73 (listing necessary out-of-school systems for at-risk students).
MCGUINN, supra note 36, at 33.
HESS & PETRILLI, supra note 173, at 21 (“NCLB advocates . . . . were concerned about the
nation’s ‘achievement gap’—primarily the disparity between the performance of white
and Asian students, on the one hand, and African-American and Latino students, on the
other.”).
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189

mance.” NCLB adopts the viewpoint that failures on the school and
district levels explain poor student performance and strong accountability measures will incentivize schools to improve achievement le190
vels.
Every state agreed to fulfill the accountability measures imposed under the statute’s scheme for improvement in academic
191
Although many states have criticized NCLB’s manperformance.
dates and schedule for improvement, it is still the nation’s premier
education policy.
2. The Federal Tug-of-War over the Role of “Scientifically-based
Research”—Courts v. the Executive and Legislative Branches
The social science literature available to Congress while deliberating ESEA focused heavily on how a student’s socioeconomic status
192
might affect academic performance.
Similar to contemporary debate, scholars contested the most effective methods for educating
disadvantaged children, the effects of race and socioeconomic diversity on a student’s academic performance, and the way government
193
could best support improvements in public education. As circumstances change, social science research tracks developments to better
understand academic performance, and NCLB encourages school of194
ficials to participate in these investigations.
State courts also have
relied on research-based methods to craft remedies for adequacy law-

189
190

191

192

193
194

Id. at 22.
Id. at 23 (“[NCLB] is premised on the notion that local education politics are fundamentally broken, and that only strong, external pressure on school systems, focused on student achievement, will produce a political dynamic that leads to school improvement.”).
See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND: A ROAD MAP FOR STATE
IMPLEMENTATION 3 (2005), available at http://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/
roadmap/roadmap.pdf (“Within 18 months of [NCLB’s] passage, all 50 states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico had submitted detailed plans for meeting NCLB’s student achievement goals.”).
MCGUINN, supra note 36, at 31–32 (“ESEA was premised on the idea that the federal government should intervene in what was increasingly seen as an education crisis among
poor and minority children.”).
Id. at 31–33; REBELL & WOLFF, supra note 36, at 47–48.
Jonathan Margolin & Beth Buchler, Critical Issue: Using Scientifically Based Research to Guide
Educational Decisions, N. CENT. REG’L EDUC. LAB., LEARNING POINT ASSOCS.,
http://merainc.org/archives/past_conferences/fall2010/pdfs/GullenHandout1.pdf (last
visited Oct. 24, 2011) (“The imperative for incorporating SBR is dictated not only by federal law, but by common sense as well. . . . [E]ducators will need to care about SBR and
how it impacts success in their school. They will need to learn and understand SBR in
order to improve learning in the classroom and integrate SBR into their educational
modus operandi.”).
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195

suits. The Supreme Court, by providing greater deference to state
and local school districts, could find a way to accommodate social
science research without allowing trends to dictate a constitutional
decision’s outcome.
a. The Federal Courts and Social Science Evidence
In Brown I, the NAACP’s briefs explicitly relied on social science
196
evidence to support its arguments against segregated schools. The
Court referenced social science evidence reaching the same conclu197
sions in a footnote of the Brown I opinion. This reference to sociological studies continues to raise contentions about the validity of the
research and the weight to be given social science when determining
198
constitutional issues.
Justice Frankfurter believed that “courts had to frankly concern
themselves with considerations of good policy, considerations that
199
should rest on the best available scientific learning.” Not every Justice shares this opinion. In Missouri v. Jenkins, Justice Thomas emphatically stated that social science research “cannot form the basis
upon which [the Court] decide[s] matters of constitutional prin200
ciple.”
He went on to declare that “[t]he judiciary is fully competent to make independent determinations concerning the existence
of state action without the unnecessary and misleading assistance of
201
the social sciences.” He insisted that lower courts resist being influenced by “the easy answers of social science” and encouraged them to

195

196

197
198

199
200
201

Access Quality Education: A Costing-Out Primer, NAT’L ACCESS NETWORK (June 1, 2006),
http://www.schoolfunding.info/resource_center/costingoutprimer.php3 (noting that
“[a] variety of approaches for undertaking such [adequacy] studies have been used in recent years in many states . . . in some cases as part of the development of a new funding
system ordered by a state court”).
Moran, What Counts as Knowledge, supra note 155, at 517–18 (detailing the manner in
which the NAACP approached the Brown I brief and incorporated social science evidence
into its argument); see also KLUGER, supra note 50, at 315–21 (recounting the development of social science evidence and the NAACP’s use of it).
See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954) (listing psychological studies).
Moran, What Counts as Knowledge, supra note 155, at 518 (noting that following Brown I
“some believed that the case would usher in a new partnership between law and social
science”); Michael Heise, Judicial Decision-Making, Social Science Evidence, and Equal Educational Opportunity: Uneasy Relations and Uncertain Futures, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 863 (2008)
(analyzing the contentious use of social science evidence in constitutional cases).
COTTROL ET AL., supra note 78, at 81.
Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 120 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 121.
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reject “the findings, and the assumptions, of sociology and psycholo202
gy at the price of constitutional principle.”
Justice Marshall addressed similar arguments in Rodriguez. He did
not argue directly on behalf of using social science. However, he
admonished the Court’s majority for extrapolating positive assertions
from inconclusive evidence. In Rodriguez, he contends that: “If, as
the majority stresses, such authorities are uncertain as to the impact
of various levels of funding on educational quality, I fail to see where
it finds the expertise to divine that the particular levels of fund203
ing . . . assure an adequate educational opportunity . . . .”
In Parents Involved, the Court found two voluntary desegregation
204
In this case, the Court consolidated chalplans unconstitutional.
lenges brought against the Seattle School Board and Jefferson Coun205
ty Board of Education.
At the district court level, in the Seattle
case, the trial judge identified three interests:
(1) to promote the educational benefits of diverse school enrollments;
(2) to reduce the potentially harmful effects of racial isolation by allowing students the opportunity to opt out of racially isolated schools; and
(3) to make sure that racially segregated housing patterns did not prevent non-white students from having equitable access to the most popular
206
over-subscribed schools.

The Jefferson County Board of Education also asserted racial balance
and its benefits as a compelling government interest.
The majority of the Justices supported the benefits of diversity as a
207
compelling government interest under the strict scrutiny test.
However, Justice Thomas railed against the benefits of diversity as a
compelling interest, stating that, “[s]cholars have differing opinions
208
as to whether educational benefits arise from racial balancing.” He
further claimed that “it would leave our equal protection jurisprudence at the mercy of elected officials evaluating the evanescent views
209
of a handful of social scientists.”
Accordingly, he concluded

202
203
204

205
206
207
208
209

Id. at 122–23.
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 89 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 551 U.S. 701, 709–11 (2007) (“The
Courts of Appeals below upheld the [student assignment] plans. We granted certiorari,
and now reverse.”).
Id.
Id. at 786–87 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 803 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“This Court has recognized that the public interests at
stake in such cases are ‘compelling.’”).
Id. at 761 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 766 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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“[e]ven if current social theories favor classroom racial engineering
as necessary to solve the problems at hand, the Constitution en210
Justice Breyer
shrines principles independent of social theories.”
responded directly to Justice Thomas by noting:
If we are to insist upon unanimity in the social science literature before
finding a compelling interest, we might never find one. I believe only
that the Constitution allows democratically elected school boards to
make up their own minds as to how best to include people of all races in
211
one America.

Defining the role of social science data in constitutional judicialdecisionmaking continues to divide the Supreme Court and constitutional scholars. In the education context, however, school districts
must incorporate social science data when developing reforms. The
following sections describe the federal requirements for districts to
use social science data and how the Supreme Court may accommodate such evidence when determining the constitutionality of education policies.
b. Congress, the Department of Education and Social Science
Evidence
In the education context, the federal courts should consider social
212
science research. For program development, teaching assessment,
and tracking school progress, NCLB requires “scientifically based research” as a guide to implementing best practices, which leaves edu213
cators to choose a preferred method.
The standard is defined as
“research that involves the application of rigorous, systematic, and objective procedures to obtain reliable and valid knowledge relevant to
214
education activities and programs.” For example, Section 1114 re210
211
212

213

214

Id. at 780 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 845 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
See HESS & PETRILLI, supra note 173, at 97 (“NCLB’s scientifically based research provisions were intended not to require that all educational research adopt one particular methodological approach, but that educational practice be guided by research that is rigorous and reliable.”); Danielle Holley-Walker, Educating at the Crossroads: Parents Involved,
No Child Left Behind and School Choice, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 911, 920 (2008) (noting that in Parents Involved, the Court’s plurality opinion “avoid[ed] the social science altogether” when
it conflicted with school districts’ “good faith determination that there was enough evidence to support adopting a race-conscious student assignment policy”).
See Aaron J. Saiger, Legislating Accountability: Standards, Sanctions, and School District Reform,
46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1655, 1724 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“[NCLB]
is . . . agnostic as to pedagogical method, with the very important exception that once districts are identified as needing improvement they must implement ‘strategies based on
scientifically based research.’”).
No Child Left Behind Act, 20 U.S.C. § 7801 (2006).
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quires schools to implement “school-wide programs” based on “strategies that . . . use effective methods and instructional strategies that
are based on scientifically based research that strengthen the core
academic program in the school; increase the amount and quality of
learning time . . .; and include strategies for meeting the educational
215
needs of historically underserved populations.”
The Department of Education stands in full support of the congressional mandate to rely on social science evidence when developing educational programs. The What Works Clearinghouse, operated
by the Department of Education, maintains a publicly available data216
base of scientifically based programs in effect across the country.
Additionally, President Obama’s administration implemented the
Race to the Top program through the American Recovery Reinvest217
ment Act of 2009. School districts and schools participating in Race
to the Top compete for education grants administered through the
Department of Education. Although proposals need not be scientifically based for approval, the competition encourages educators to
218
replicate programs already proven as effective.
The science-topolicy transition has undoubtedly been criticized for major programs
charged to improve educational outcomes through the data; however, Congress set forth a standard that the Court should apply when
assessing the credence to be given research for constitutional chal219
lenges.

215
216

217

218

219

Id. § 6314(b)(1)(B).
About Us: What Works Clearinghouse, INST. OF EDUC. SCIS., http://www.ies.ed.gov/
ncee/wwc/AboutUs.aspx (last visited Oct. 24, 2011) (“[T]he What Works Clearinghouse
(WWC) was created in 2002 to be a central and trusted source of scientific evidence for
what works in education.”).
See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, §§ 14001–14013, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123
Stat. 115, 279–286 (2009) (detailing the subsections of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act related to the Race to the Top program).
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., RACE TO THE TOP PROGRAM EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2 (2009), available
at http://www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/executive-summary.pdf (explaining the
competitive nature of Race to the Top).
Dan Liston et al., NCLB and Scientifically-Based Research: Opportunities Lost and Found, 58 J.
TCHR. EDUC. 99 (2007); Joseph L. Mahoney & Edward F. Zigler, Translating Science to Policy Under the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001: Lessons From the National Evaluation of the 21stCentury Community Learning Centers, 27 J. APPLIED DEV. PSYCHOL. 282 (2006); Alan H.
Schoenfeld, What Doesn’t Work: The Challenge and Failure of the What Works Clearinghouse to
Conduct Meaningful Reviews of Studies of Mathematics Curricula, 35 EDUC. RES. no.2, 13
(2006); Dick Schutz, The Non-Impact of Reading First—Where to Go From Here, TCHRS C. REC.,
Feb. 12, 2009.
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c. A Doctrinal Solution
The treatment of social science in the education context, as envisioned by accepting quality education to be a recognized government
interest, would require federal courts to give legislative bodies deference when filtering which social science evidence should or should
not inform policy decisions. This reliance on legislative deference
should be distinguished from relying on the expert testimony of social scientists to sway constitutional decisions.
The Brown litigation strategy and the Court’s opinion, unlike any
previous constitutional dispute, incorporated social science as evi220
dence to prove the plaintiffs’ harm. Thurgood Marshall, persuaded
by then-attorney Robert Carter, presented Dr. Kenneth Clark’s psychological studies regarding the effects of segregated schools on a
221
black student’s self-image. Justice Warren, in footnote eleven of the
Brown opinion, cited to several social science studies on the psycho222
logical harms resulting from segregated schooling.
The prominence of social science in Brown inspired much legal scholarship on
the interplay between law and society when determining constitutional questions. Even Brown proponents questioned whether social
science should have played any role in reaching an otherwise sound
decision.
Rachel Moran, comparing the use of social science in Brown and
Parents Involved in Community Schools, concludes that
in Brown, research on the inescapable harms of segregation, even in dual
school systems that had equalized, was a legislative fact. It bore on the
normative question at the heart of the Court’s constitutional dilemma:
Could separate ever be equal? In Parents Involved in Community Schools v.
Seattle School District, studies on the benefits of diversity in elementary and
secondary schools played an analogous role. This research was deployed
to support a normative commitment to color consciousness, not just as a
223
remedy for past discrimination but as a bridge to a multiracial future.

She also observes that “[a] formalist approach requires courts to look
to their judicial predecessors, not contemporary social scientists, to
224
determine what the law should look like.”
A more general critique of social science in relation to constitutional decisions argues that “[t]he Court has (1) misused or misapplied data when it believes the data will enhance the persuasiveness of
220
221
222
223
224

KLUGER, supra note 50, at 315–21.
Id.
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954).
Moran, What Counts as Knowledge, supra note 155, at 533 (citations omitted).
Id. at 537.
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its opinions; (2) ignored or rejected data despite its assertion of empirically testable statements; and (3) disparaged data when the research does not support its views. In some cases, it has done all
225
three.”
Under federal constitutional review, if the scientific research relied upon by either party does not meet NCLB’s standard, then the
Court should not allow the evidence. Social scientists testify as trial
experts, and social scientists help to inform legislative decisions. Policy decisions made on the district and state levels using scientificallybased research, as contemplated under NCLB, should be treated as
though based on legislative fact. In Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v.
Federal Communications Commission, the Court set forth its test for determining the constitutionality of congressional statutes based on the
226
legislature’s “predictive judgments.” The deference given Congress
leaves the Court to consider whether “‘in formulating its judgments,
Congress has drawn reasonable inferences based on substantial evi227
dence.’”
The Court concedes that the deference permitted Congress emanates from the institution being “far better equipped than
the judiciary to amass and evaluate the vast amounts of data bearing
228
upon legislative questions.” Moreover, the Court recognizes a “re229
spect for [Congress’s] authority to exercise the legislative power.”
Courts should bestow this same respect on school districts that use research-based models to develop quality education programs for closing the achievement gap.
B. The Inevitability of Race in Education Reform
The Court’s overemphasis on race is proving detrimental to the
broader goal of quality education in the public system. The Supreme
Court’s more recent precedents apply a monotone analysis to education reforms—one that is historical and that fails to recognize how
230
other factors influence academic performance.
A cohesive framework, with an epicenter of quality education, links the purpose behind assigning tiered levels of scrutiny to varying classifications and
225

226
227
228
229
230

Donald N. Bersoff & David J. Glass, The Not-So Weisman: The Supreme Court’s Continuing
Misuse of Social Science Research, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 279, 293 (1995) (footnote
omitted).
Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 196 (1997).
Turner, 520 U.S. at 195 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S 622, 666 (1994)).
Turner, 520 U.S. at 195 (quoting Turner, 512 U.S at 665) (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 196.
See Jordan M. Steiker, Brown’s Descendants, 52 HOW. L.J. 583, 603 (2009) (describing recent precedential cases that uniformly agree all racial classifications are intolerable).
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contemporary reform goals. A focus on quality education also allays
the concerns of education policy-makers attempting to reconcile federal constitutional interpretations and myriad legislative obligations.
Resurrecting broader equality arguments will open room for educational experts to explore solutions that may be forbidden under
current law. As the pre-Brown legal strategy unfolded in the Supreme
Court, the law evolved to recognize how a state’s attempt to provide
objective equal resources did not wholly address more comprehensive
equality goals; instead, an “intangible” component factored into satis231
fying the equality standards expressed in Brown.
Offsetting the effects of these intangible factors forces us to consider categories
beyond race.
1. NCLB’s Disaggregated Reporting Requirement
Social scientists acknowledge race, gender and socioeconomic status as inextricable factors hindering the academic performance of
232
“disadvantaged” students. On the other hand, the judiciary subordinates gender and socioeconomic status to race in reviewing the
233
constitutionality of education policy. Federal legislation places the
classifications on separate planes for remedial purposes but not accountability. Federal equal protection doctrine should incorporate
the state’s definition of quality education as a government interest.
This change will signify recognition of our broadest goal to educate
all Americans with the requisite sensitivity to local circumstances.
Congress’s definition of disadvantaged or at-risk children is constantly in flux for funding purposes—while the Court is stuck with
race and wealth classifications. Periodically, through ESEA’s legislative history, Congress has expanded the categories eligible to be considered disadvantaged under the statute. Now, under NCLB, Title I
seeks to achieve its purpose by “meeting the educational needs of
low-achieving children in our Nation’s highest-poverty schools, limited English proficient children, migratory children, children with
disabilities, Indian children, neglected or delinquent children, and
231

232
233

See McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (holding that
the University of Oklahoma violated a student’s equal protection rights by imposing segregated conditions under which African-American students were to receive their education); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 633 (1950) (discussing how the newly opened law
school for African Americans in Texas did create “substantial equality in the educational
opportunities offered white and Negro law students by the state”).
Robinson, supra note 24, at 320, 327 n.325.
Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 551 U.S. 710, 719 (2007); Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
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234

young children in need of reading assistance.” The statement goes
on to address the achievement gap between “minority and nonminority students, and between disadvantaged children and their more ad235
vantaged peers.”
Prior to NCLB, state-level reforms often sought to track school
236
performance based on the entire student population. This method
overlooked the nuances necessary to improve education for particular disadvantaged groups. As Congress moved away from simply contributing funds, it implemented statutes to prevent segregation and
ensure steps were taken to provide a quality public education to all
students, including racial and ethnic minorities, the impoverished,
English-language learners, and the learning disabled. Under NCLB,
schools must report their student population’s performance on standardized tests in the following categories: “ethnic and racial groups,
low-income students, students with disabilities, and students with li237
mited English proficiency.”
2. Race and State Adequate Education Goals
Many scholars understand, study, and measure academic performance in elementary and secondary education based on identifiable
groups. Furthermore, our approach to developing effective education reforms requires an appreciation for how protected traits intersect to affect a child’s performance in public schools. Accordingly,
the Court’s antidiscrimination doctrine and discrete categorization of
traits undermines the work done by education experts to tailor programs and allocate funding. By recognizing a category of at-risk students receiving subpar educational services, the Supreme Court
would align its Fourteenth Amendment analysis with the challenges
and expectations borne upon educators.
Under their respective state constitutional education clauses and
equal protection clauses, state supreme courts have recognized the
need to address racial isolation and race imbalance in public schools
as a component of quality education. In Bustop v. Board of Education of
Los Angeles, the Supreme Court gave sway to California’s interpretation of its state constitution in permitting a busing plan for Los Angeles Unified School District designed to bring about greater dese-

234
235
236
237

No Child Left Behind Act, 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2) (2006).
Id. § 6301 (3).
HESS & PETRILLI, supra note 173, at 35.
Id. at 29, 35.
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238

gregation. Writing for the Court, Justice Rehnquist concluded that
state courts “are free to interpret the Constitution of the State to impose more stringent restrictions on the operation of a local school
239
board.” He added that “[w]hile I have the gravest doubts that the
Supreme Court of California was required by the United State Constitution to take the action that it has taken in this case, I have very little
240
doubt that it was permitted by that Constitution to take such action.”
In Morean v. Board of Education of Montclair, the Supreme Court of
New Jersey held that a school district “need [not] close its eyes to racial imbalance in its schools which, though fortuitous in origin,
presents much the same disadvantages as are presented by segregated
241
Citing the state’s constitution and Brown, the court
schools.”
reached this conclusion on the reasoning that New Jersey schools
must “maintain a sound educational system by the furnishment of
242
suitable school facilities and equal educational opportunities.”
In Citizens Against Mandatory Bussing v. Palmason, the Washington
Supreme Court allowed the school board deference in crafting a desegregation plan aimed at alleviating de facto racial discrimination in
243
the public schools. Similarly, in Crawford v. Board of Education of Los
Angeles, the Supreme Court of California once again permitted the
use of race under its state constitution. The court held that “public
school districts bear an obligation under the state Constitution to
undertake reasonably feasible steps to alleviate school segregation,
244
regardless of the cause of such segregation.”
Finally, in Sheff v. O’Neill, the Supreme Court of Connecticut considered racial isolation as an educational feature appropriate for re245
dress under the state’s constitution.
Sheff marks the beginning of
the proposed fourth wave of state finance litigation reform, which recognizes the need for race-conscious policies in resolving educational
246
disparities.
Reflecting upon Sheff, James Ryan suggests that adequate education rights, under state constitutions, are “broad enough

238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246

439 U.S. 1380 (1978).
Id. at 1382.
Id. at 1383.
Morean v. Bd. of Educ. of Montclair, 200 A.2d 97, 100 (N.J. 1964).
Id.
495 P.2d 657, 661–62 (Wash. 1972).
551 P.2d 28, 42 (Cal. 1976).
Sheff v. O’Neill, 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996).
Black, Unlocking the Power, supra note 29, at 1361–75; Bowman, supra note 153, at 57; Farmer, supra note 23, at 463–64; McMillan, supra note 153, at 1896–1902; Morgan, supra
note 153, at 165–68.
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to encompass racial and socioeconomic integration.”
Here, the
Connecticut Supreme Court recognized racial isolation as a problem
linked to insufficient funding; thus, it held that these students’ suf248
fered disparate educational opportunities. However, race-conscious
policies implemented in response to state-judicial mandates are vul249
nerable to attack under the federal equal protection doctrine. Students with disabilities, language issues, poor students, and those attending schools that are racially isolated require more money to
250
educate at an adequate level. The Fourteenth Amendment should
allow states to craft policies based on their citizens’ myriad special
needs—an antisubordination framework permits the flexibility
251
needed to assess these fluid concerns.
The Court’s equal protection doctrine may accommodate this subjectivity by recognizing quality education, as interpreted under a state’s education clause, to be a
compelling government interest.
In analyzing Brown and subsequent desegregation cases, Reva Seigel identifies antisubordination as “the conviction that it is wrong for
the state to engage in practices that enforce the inferior social status
252
of historically oppressed groups.”
Under an antisubordination
framework, policymakers may implement race-conscious laws when
253
necessary to redress a harm and its resulting adverse effects. On the
other hand, anticlassification theorists focus on the government category invoked by a law as opposed to the underlying harm to be re254
dressed pursuant to the state action. More recently, Rachel Moran
has proposed that “[a]ny recognition of schools as a place to build
complex, flexible, and dynamic identities has been hampered by the
rigid dialectic between an anti-classification and an antisubordination Constitution, a dialectic that in turn has reified

247
248
249
250
251
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254

James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 309 (1999).
Goodwin Liu, The Parted Paths of School Desegregation and School Finance Litigation, 24 L. &
INEQ. 81, 104 (2006).
Bowman, supra note 83, at 983–85; Bowman, supra note 153, at 63.
Black, Unlocking the Power, supra note 29, at 1343, 1374–75; Ryan, supra note 247, at 285,
296.
Balkin & Siegel, supra note 24, at 15 (stating “the practical reach of the antisubordination
principle is open to debate at any given historical moment, and . . . its reach shifts over
time”); id. at 14 (“The question of what . . . might be subordinating involves interpretive
judgments about social meaning, status, and the like, each of which is plainly contestable.”).
Siegel, supra note 24, at 1472–73.
Moran, Politics of Discretion, supra note 83, at 1321, 1335.
Balkin, supra note 67, at 1564–65; Moran, Politics of Discretion, supra note 83, at 1334; Siegel, supra note 24, at 1495, 1498–99.
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race.” She suggests that, in the education context, “culture-race can
create a positive, autonomous space for identity-building in a world
256
no longer organized along oppositional, binary racial lines.”
The federal and state governing bodies of public education recognize racial classifications as part and parcel in achieving quality
education goals. The following section discusses federal executivelevel and state-level initiatives to direct resources towards the quality
education of Latino students. This focus emanates from the increase
of Latino populations in the United States, particularly in certain
geographic regions. In the United States, one in every five public
257
school children claims a Latino background. While opponents resist the allocation of public funds to one group, as identified by a protected classification, quality education goals require these reforms in
closing the achievement gap.
C. The Cooperative Effort to Educate Latino Americans
1. The Executive Branch Embraces Demographic Shifts, Community, and
Local Control
Communication between policymakers and the community remains a key component to successful reform. Professors Amanda
Broun and Wendy Puriefoy argue that “inclusion of the public voice
is an important element of the public engagement framework because the voice of the community has been historically excluded from
the debate, resulting in reform that is rarely system-wide and even
258
more rarely sustained.”
In Parents Involved, Justice Breyer opined
that
the law often leaves legislatures, city councils, school boards, and voters
with a broad range of choice, thereby giving “different communities” the
opportunity to “try different solutions to common problems and gravitate
toward those that prove most successful or seem to them best to suit their
259
individual needs.”

255
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Moran, Rethinking Race, supra note 83, at 1358.
Id. at 1359.
Richard Fry & Felisa Gonzales, One-in-Five and Growing Fast: A Profile of Hispanic Public
School Students, PEW HISPANIC CTR. (Aug. 26, 2008), http:/www.pewhispanic.org/reports/
report. php?ReportID=92.
Amanda R. Broun & Wendy D. Puriefoy, Public Engagement in School Reform: Building Public
Responsibility for Public Education, 4 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 217, 242 (2008).
Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 551 U.S. 701, 822 (2007) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 28 (1st Cir. 2005) (Boudin, C.J., concurring)).
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Education reform is constantly in flux because the demographics
of inner city districts and the federal influence over public education
continue to change. The Civil Rights Project at the University of California reported increased suburban diversity in Indiana due to an increase in the Latino student population and first time “majorityminority” ratios in Abilene, Texas, based on an increase in Latino
260
student enrollment.
Over an eighteen-month period, the White
House conducted a listening tour around the country to develop
strategies for improving public education services provided in Latino
261
communities. In October 2010, President Obama signed an executive order that “calls for the establishment of a presidential advisory
commission on Hispanic education and a federal interagency work262
ing group on how to improve the education and lives of Latinos.” It
also aims to “support communities to share best practices in the education of Hispanic students and to strengthen public and private
263
partnerships.”
2. State Officials Embrace Demographic Shifts and Community
School officials must consider an array of characteristics and social
circumstances, cued to their population, when crafting education
264
policies. Race will inevitably enter the equation for many states and
urban districts. The Court’s current Fourteenth Amendment analysis
could deter policymakers’ willingness to experiment in a reform climate that encourages innovation and a focus on particular minority
groups. In Plyler, Justice Brennan explained that
[t]he initial discretion to determine what is “different” and what is “the
same” resides in the legislature of the States. A legislature must have substantial latitude to establish classifications that roughly approximate the
nature of the problem perceived, that accommodate competing concerns
both public and private, and that account for limitations on the practical
265
ability of the State to remedy every ill.

Local officials deserve some leeway in observing and rectifying problems in their states and districts. Following NCLB and President Obama’s lead, New Mexico’s Hispanic Education Act seeks to close the
260
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Adai Tefera et al., School Integration Efforts Three Years After Parents Involved, THE CIVIL
RIGHTS PROJECT (2010), http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/legal-developments/courtdecisions/school-integration-efforts-three-years-after-parents-involved/teferea-schoolintegration-three-years-after.pdf.
Zehr, supra note 20.
Id.
Id.
Black, Unlocking the Power, supra note 29, at 1353–54; Bowman, supra note 83, at 964.
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achievement gap between Latino students and their white and Asian
peers. It is the first state education legislation in the country focused
266
In New
exclusively on improving performance for these students.
Mexico, Latino students compose 56% of the public school students
267
and only 56% graduate as compared to 71% of white students. The
Hispanic Education Act, among other features, creates a liaison to
the state’s public education department charged with developing policies, consulting with the districts, and communicating with an advi268
sory council.
The statute also includes reporting requirements to
269
track progress on closing the gap.
A spokeswoman for the New
Mexico Public Education Department offers that “the main thing
[the Hispanic Education Act] did was formalize community engage270
ment and the community voice in crafting public policy.” The statute aims to improve student performance by incorporating a cultu271
rally based curriculum and increasing parent involvement.
In Horne v. Flores, decided during the Supreme Court’s 2009 term,
parents from Arizona’s Nogales School District challenged whether
the state fulfilled its duty under the Equal Educational Opportunities
Act, to appropriately transition Spanish-speaking students into the
272
mainstream classroom.
The Court’s decision hinged on a procedural issue, which brought to light substantive matters regarding the
best approach for educating English learning students, state and local
deference, and NCLB requirements. The Horne v. Flores litigation
commenced over ten years ago. In 2000, the presiding federal district court declared that the school district’s ELL program violated
273
federal mandates due to funding deficiencies.
Several years later,
274
the state legislature approved a funding increase. In response, cer266
267
268
269

270
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Clark, supra note 4.
Childress, supra note 5.
Bryan, supra note 6.
Id. (“The Public Education Department would also be required to submit an annual report on the statewide status of Hispanic education from preschool through high
school.”); see also Clark, supra note 4.
Elizabeth Piazza, New Law Hopes to Close Achievement Gap for Hispanic Students, THE DAILY
TIMES (Farmington, N.M.), July 1, 2010, http://www.publiceducation.org/nclb_articles/
archive/20100701_New.asp (alteration in original).
See, e.g., Clark, supra note 4; Heather Clark, Richardson-Proposed Hispanic Education Act
Draws
Scrutiny,
SANTA
FE
NEW
MEXICAN,
Dec.
4,
2009,
http://www.santafenewmexican.com/localnews/Hispanic-Education-Act-Proposal-drawsscrutiny.
129 S. Ct. 2579, 2588–89 (2009).
Id. at 2589 (“[The] defendants were violating the EEOA because the amount of funding
the Sate allocated for the special needs of ELL students . . . was arbitrary and not related
to the actual funding needed to cover the costs of ELL instruction in Nogales.”).
Id. at 2590.
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tain state actors sought a Rule 60(b)(5) motion in the district court,
arguing that changes in the facts and law required it to revisit the
275
previous judgment. In 2009, the Supreme Court passed judgment
276
on the motion’s legitimacy. Although not definitively deciding the
motion, the Court provided invaluable insight on relevant considerations in the education context.
First, the Court determined that “appropriate action,” as required
in the statute, must be defined by the state as indicated in the sta277
tute. Second, the Court concluded that the state’s decision to implement an English immersion methodology over a bilingual education methodology fell within the state’s discretion in light of social
278
science research. Third, the Court found NCLB’s governance over
standards for ELL education presented a “changed circumstance”
under the procedural rule because it caused programmatic reforms,
affected federal funding of ELL educational programs, required assessments and reports on program improvements, and demonstrated
279
greater federal involvement in education reform.
In Horne v. Flores, the Supreme Court held out a measured deference to legislative bodies. This same deference should apply to local
school districts and states that are adjusting to the “changed circumstance” of closing the achievement gap between at-risk students and
their peers, improving education in Latino communities, and developing research-based programs that inevitably use protected classifications.
D. Intersectionality: The Complicated Dynamics to Explaining Academic
Underperformance
In lieu of federal courts controlling the boundaries for education
reform, the varying educational needs based on a district’s demographics support deference to local control and the incorporation of
state constitutional interpretations with regards to defining a quality
education. Even if local systems are broken, by expanding the constitutionality test, we recognize that many failed institutions contribute
to the condition of public education. In Rodriguez, the Court confronted the difficulties with education quality, stating that “in view of
the infinite variables affecting the educational process, [no system]
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Id. at 2606.
Id. at 2597.
Id. at 2600–01.
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can . . . assure equal quality of education except in the most relative
280
sense.” This may be a true observation, but the Court’s categorical
treatment of these “infinite variables” restricts school districts from
crafting solutions that address the intersectionality of a child’s background. In the context of education, I agree that race contributes to
explanations of the achievement gap, but if we were to eliminate racism today, many poor people would still exist in the United States.
And, according to the research, both race and class contribute to the
education problems facing public schools.
The only desegregation case that addresses the inextricable link
between race and socioeconomic status is Hobson v. Hansen, decided
281
in the federal district court for the District of Columbia.
The district court’s willingness to simultaneously consider both traits affecting quality education facilitated a comprehensive analysis penetrating
issues not addressed under an antidiscrimination lens with tiered
scrutiny levels. As the following review of Judge Skelly Wright’s opinion demonstrates, more nuanced issues related to quality education,
such as tracking and housing patterns, may reveal themselves when
federal courts concern themselves with more than assignment based
on race. For example, Kristi Bowman proposes a multi-factor socioeconomic approach for Latino/a students which accounts for the
“student’s English language speaking skills, whether English is spo282
ken at home, and whether a student lives in public housing.”
In Hobson, the parents of black and socio-economically disadvantaged children challenged the neighborhood school plan implemented by school officials in response to the Court’s ruling in Bolling
283
v. Sharpe, the companion case to Brown. The district court defined
the issue as whether the school district “unconstitutionally deprive[d]
the District’s [black] and poor public school children of their right to
equal educational opportunity with the District’s white and more af284
fluent public school children.”
In drawing connections between
race and socioeconomic status, the district court acknowledged how
the city’s housing patterns were changing and could be traced along
racial lines; therefore, the neighborhood school policy caused the racial and socioeconomic demographics of residential areas to replicate
280
281
282
283
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Bowman, supra note 153, at 68.
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285

themselves in classrooms. The court based its assessment of the urgent need for remedial action on
the degree to which the poor and the [black] must rely on the public
schools in rescuing themselves from their depressed cultural and economic condition, and also our common need of the schools to serve as
the public agency for neutralizing and normalizing race relations in the
country. With these interests at stake, the court must ask whether the virtues stemming from the . . . [education policy] are compelling or adequate justification for the considerable evils of de facto segregation which
286
adherence to this policy breeds.

The court then went one step further to acknowledge that not only did the district’s plan segregate students between schools, but the
district’s tracking system resegregated integrated schools by dispro287
portionately assigning black and poor children to lower tracks. In
reviewing the track system, the district court addressed the proposition that the system adversely affects black and poor children to a
288
greater extent than white middle-class students.
The court accepted that the track system “as presently practiced in the District of
Columbia school system is a denial of equal educational opportunity
to the poor and a majority of the [blacks] attending school in the na289
tion’s capital.” With this in mind, the court decided to examine the
290
track system “in theory and in reality.”
The court considered evidence showing the track system’s deficiencies with respect to poor
children and black students, who composed the majority demograph291
ic in the public school system under attack.
The court labeled a
child’s socioeconomic background as a “shorthand way of identifying
those backgrounds that are more or less conducive to becoming a
292
successful student.”
The equal protection doctrine can and should account for the
myriad factors affecting students in any particular school district
across the country. The Seattle School District implemented a plan
that considered factors beyond the student’s choice: where a student’s sibling attends school, the student’s race, and the school’s
293
proximity to the student’s home.
Because race entered into the
equation at all, the Court fixed its attention on applying its strict scru285
286
287
288
289
290
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293
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Id. at 442–43.
Id. at 443.
Id.
Id. at 451.
Id. at 454.
Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 551 U.S. 701, 711–12 (2007).
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tiny analysis with no regard for how the other factors considered in
294
placing students may have affected the policy’s constitutionality.
Justice Breyer observed that race “constitute[s] but one part of plans
that depend primarily upon other, nonracial elements. . . . In fact,
the defining feature of both plans is greater emphasis upon student
295
choice.”
Moreover, scholars following desegregation and school
finance litigation trends persuasively argue for policies providing
more money based on student need, even if this may require raceconscious policies, combined with renewed efforts to racially and
296
ethnically integrate schools.
Social scientists also show that many
297
factors play into determining a student’s academic success.
As school administrators respond to the needs unique to their locale, the Court’s protected classifications mutate into something not
contemplated by the discrete, insular classes identified in the Carolene
298
Products and Brown opinions.
For example, whereas challenges to
educate black male students plague many urban districts, this problem does not exist in some regions. In Appalachia, the education
problem revolves around communities populated by white students.
The end result may be for districts to rely less on race, opting for less
effective alternatives, when correcting academic performance is299
sues.
Some scholars suggest socioeconomic integration programs,
which to this point have been immune from federal constitutional
challenge but may be less effective than programs accounting for a
300
student’s race.
Moreover, socioeconomic integration encounters
294
295
296

297

298
299

300
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geographic hurdles similar to race integration within urban districts,
as “14% of school districts nationwide do not have enough middle301
class schools to achieve socioeconomic integration.”
A quality education standard permits districts to tailor policies fitting their constituency, whether poor Latino students make up the
majority population or impoverished white students in Appalachia
need special educational programs. The flexibility to consider the
whole student is an invaluable condition to successful reform.
CONCLUSION
In its effort to eradicate any consideration of race in educational
policies, the Court is undermining federal and local efforts for educational quality. Judicial deference to educational policymakers, even
when the policy is imperfect, is the best hope for achieving educational quality.
Brown v. Board of Education fought for quality public education.
Choosing the appropriate remedy fell into the hands of federal
courts due to pubic resistance when Brown outlawed a pervasive social
norm. The Court made clear, however, that their remedial authority
entailed restraints not applicable to state actors. Moreover, the Court
also recognized that the state’s primacy over public education matters
rendered the federal court’s involvement temporary. The current
Court’s approach to interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment directly challenges the work of civil rights groups aspiring for an enforceable and defined quality norm. On the state level, legislation and policy incorporate the race and socioeconomic status of students in
developing reform for quality education. These proxies, no matter
how draconian and simplistic, account for the myriad factors recognized by social science experts as affecting a child’s academic performance, yet we are incapable of considering these characteristics
under the Supreme Court’s Fourteenth Amendment analysis.
The Supreme Court, when applying its equal protection doctrine,
needs to reset its priorities. Although federal courts reject quality
education as a government interest sufficient to satisfy heightened
scrutiny, education claims have always centered around this goal.
The historical background to Brown reflects a community concerned
about the educational opportunities provided to their children.
Children enter school with the desire to learn and a naive trust in the
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system to provide them a quality education. Many parents enroll
their children in public school with the same degree of blind trust in
the system. Public education provides a foundational staging ground
to help children attain their most far-fetched dreams. The primary
responsibility for ensuring such promising results rests in the hands
of state legislatures and local school officials. The decision to implement education reforms, when sanctioned through state constitutional education clauses and federal legislation, must not be prevented through applying the Court’s anticlassification standard for
the sake of an aspirational colorblind society.

